Install verification: Ecosystem app: not installed via dsh plugin add, so the L1-L5 plugin install-verification ladder does not apply; the security scan still runs.Install verification details →
What it doesAI
Desktop client for DeepSeek Harness with AI chat, terminal and Git tools, API access, themes, desktop pet, usage stats and remote mobile control.
- AI chat, terminal and Git tools in one desktop client
- Whale Bridge API/subscription access plus themes and desktop pet
- Usage statistics and remote connection from phone
Capability tags are AI-inferred or rule-extracted from the README (see badge) — vocabulary-limited, not install-verified. AI = inferred; README = literal keyword from the readme.
Installation
Ecosystem apps are not installable via dsh plugin add: desktop / web shells install or deploy through their own release channel (GitHub Releases or the project site).
The level reads L5 · Ecosystem plugin / L5 · Ecosystem app per the three-way classification (the L1-L5 ladder does not rate them); the security scan still runs.
Verification & Compatibility◼ Ecosystem app
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
| plugin ＼ dsh | dsh 0.2.1-alpha.2 |
|---|---|
| v0.3.9 | · |
| v0.3.8 | · |
| v0.3.7 | · |
| v0.3.6 | · |
v0.3.9github2026-10-21
https://github.com/ChisaAlter/WhaleIsle
Ecosystem app: not installed via dsh plugin add (a desktop / web shell) — its level reads L5 · Ecosystem app.
v0.3.8github2026-10-18
https://github.com/ChisaAlter/WhaleIsle
Ecosystem app: not installed via dsh plugin add (a desktop / web shell) — its level reads L5 · Ecosystem app.
v0.3.7github2026-10-15
https://github.com/ChisaAlter/WhaleIsle
Ecosystem app: not installed via dsh plugin add (a desktop / web shell) — its level reads L5 · Ecosystem app.
v0.3.6github2026-10-14
https://github.com/ChisaAlter/WhaleIsle
Ecosystem app: not installed via dsh plugin add (a desktop / web shell) — its level reads L5 · Ecosystem app.
Only the latest 3 published versions are shown; source-snapshot (commit hash) groups, unstated groups and older versions are omitted — the full archive stays in the data layer (snapshot/unstated groups appear only when a plugin has no published version).
Author badges
Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/whaleisle/)`Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static low, dynamic low — stricter wins → overall low.
v0.3.9v0.3.9git2026-10-21v0.3.9same versionclean · gitVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (7)
- criticalmanifest-bare-fs · sandbox
vendor/deepseek-harness/apps/cli/config/agent-presets/minimal/agent.cordis.ymlMutating filesystem tool shares a bare fs-local backend - warningmanifest-fs-unfenced · sandbox
vendor/deepseek-harness/apps/cli/config/agent-presets/cordis/agent.cordis.ymlMutating filesystem tool has no explicit fs backend in realm - warningmanifest-search-unfenced · sandbox
vendor/deepseek-harness/apps/cli/config/agent-presets/cordis/agent.cordis.ymlSearch tool reads without an explicit fs mount - warningmanifest-shell-unfenced · sandbox
vendor/deepseek-harness/apps/cli/config/agent-presets/cordis/agent.cordis.ymlShell tool without a sandbox runner or policy in realm - warningmanifest-shell-unfenced · sandbox
vendor/deepseek-harness/apps/cli/config/agent-presets/minimal/agent.cordis.ymlShell tool without a sandbox runner or policy in realm - warningmanifest-shell-unfenced · sandbox
vendor/deepseek-harness/apps/cli/config/agent-presets/minimal/agent.cordis.ymlShell tool without a sandbox runner or policy in realm - warningmanifest-shell-unfenced · sandbox
vendor/deepseek-harness/apps/cli/config/agent-presets/minimal/agent.cordis.ymlShell tool without a sandbox runner or policy in realm
show 2 audit findings
- lowCordis YAML !!js tag evaluates arbitrary JavaScript — present only in upstream test fixtures that are not shipped
vendor/deepseek-harness/apps/cli/tests/fixtures/github-webhook/cordis.yml:13The !!js custom YAML tag in a cordis config is evaluated as JavaScript at config-parse time, i.e. a config file is code. Here the file lives under vendor/deepseek-harness/apps/cli/tests/fixtures and is consumed only by the upstream harness e2e webhook test; the build 'files' list and the extraResources filter both exclude vendor/deepseek-harness, and the plugin never loads this path at runtime. No reachable impact for Whale Isle; it is recorded because the same loader pattern would be code execution if such a tag ever appeared in a shipped vendor/dsh-* config or user-supplied config.
- lowmacOS target disables code signing, hardened runtime and Gatekeeper assessment while the app ships electron-updater
package.json:199macOS artifacts are neither signed nor notarized and run without the hardened runtime, so the integrity of installed/updated binaries rests solely on GitHub release transport (publish.provider=github, dependency electron-updater 6.8.9). A compromised or mis-published release, or a hijacked download, has no platform-level signature check as a second line of defence. No evidence of malicious intent; this is a distribution hardening gap, and the updater code itself is not in the harvested set so its feed verification cannot be reviewed.
Entry point src/main/index.js was not harvested; visible files are configs, test fixtures and tiny modules, with only unreachable YAML JS-eval and unsigned-macOS hardening gaps.
Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-10-21 · activity: Active
• Repo created: 2026-08-13
• Stars: ★ 179 · Forks: 9
• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days
Source
GitHub: github.com/ChisaAlter/WhaleIsle
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).