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Install verification: runtime verified (L5) · tested on dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 · last checked Install verification details →
What it does
DeepSeek Harness plugin: a wa_* tool family that lets the agent operate a WhatsApp account through a bundled Baileys bridge.
Installation
dsh plugin --profile web add github:songjongdevsecops/wa-agentInstall method: GitHub · runtime verified (L5)
Verification & Compatibility
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
○ The author declares no dsh version requirement — install is not blocked by version.
| plugin \ dsh | dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 current |
|---|---|
| bccdf2 | ✓ |
bccdf2github✓ 1 runtime-verified2026-10-19
https://github.com/songjongdevsecops/wa-agent
✓dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-19L5 · runtime verified
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/songjongdevsecops/wa-agent (version unstated)
ID: wa-agent@bccdf2@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-19 · expires: 2026-10-26
View checks & evidence
active in loader tree (150 entries)
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
Author badges
Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/wa-agent/)``[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/wa-agent/)`Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static low, dynamic high — stricter wins → overall high.
v0.2.0dsh manifest0.2.0git2026-10-190.2.0same versionclean · gitVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (6)
- warningnetIp · network
bridge/bridge.mjs:640httpUrl: HTTP_PORT > 0 ? `http://127.0.0.1:${HTTP_PORT}/qr.png` : null - warningnetIp · network
bridge/bridge.mjs:1539const url = new URL(req.url ?? '/', 'http://127.0.0.1') - warningchildProcess · code-exec
lib/index.js:162child = spawn(process.execPath, [bridgeFile], { - warningnetIp · network
lib/index.js:236const res = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${config.httpPort}/health`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(2500) }) - warningnetIp · network
lib/index.js:244const res = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${config.httpPort}/rpc`, { - warningnetIp · network
lib/index.js:378qr = { pending: true, httpUrl: data.qr.httpUrl ?? (httpOn ? `http://127.0.0.1:${config.httpPort}/qr.png` : null) }
show 4 audit findings
- highUnauthenticated loopback /rpc lets any local process or web page drive the WhatsApp account
bridge/bridge.mjs:1800The HTTP surface is enabled by default (lib/index.js Config httpPort default 29141 is always exported as WA_HTTP_PORT) and /rpc performs no token, Host or Origin check before calling handleRequest, i.e. the full method table: message.send/message.delete, chat.messages, message.download, contacts.clear, group.leave, logout, privacy.set. A malicious web page can trigger side-effecting calls with a no-CORS text/plain POST (the handler JSON-parses the body regardless of content-type), and DNS rebinding defeats the 127.0.0.1 bind to also read responses. /qr and /health additionally leak the pairing
- mediumPlugin adopts any process answering /health on the configured port and sends it all RPC traffic
lib/index.js:284httpHealth() only checks res.ok on http://127.0.0.1:<httpPort>/health. A local unprivileged process that binds 29141 before the plugin starts is adopted as the 'external' bridge; every subsequent request (message text, jids, contact names, media file paths, chat queries) is sent to it and its forged responses are returned to the agent as genuine WhatsApp state. No shared secret or process identity check exists.
- mediumMedia loader reads any absolute path or fetches any URL and forwards it to an arbitrary chat
bridge/bridge.mjs:1570loadMediaPayload() has no confinement to the workspace: wa_send_media / wa_profile_picture / wa_status_post accept any absolute path, read it (readFile) and send it as a WhatsApp message to a caller-chosen jid; the same function also does fetch(String(params.url)) for any URL. Because inbound WhatsApp text (including from strangers) is surfaced to the model via wa_events/wa_chat_messages, a prompt-injected agent can be steered into sending e.g. ~/.ssh/id_rsa or wa-agent/data/creds.json to an attacker's number, or into SSRF against 127.0.0.1/metadata endpoints whose body is then forwarded as me
- lowWhatsApp auth-state directory and creds are created with default filesystem permissions
bridge/bridge.mjs:69DATA_DIR (default <workspace>/wa-agent/data) is created with the process umask (typically 0755) and useMultiFileAuthState() writes creds.json/session keys with default 0644; on a multi-user host another local user can read the linked-device keys and take over the WhatsApp session.
Bundled WhatsApp bridge exposes an unauthenticated loopback /rpc that drives the whole account, and its media loader reads any absolute path / fetches any URL.
Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-10-18 · activity: Active
• Repo created: 2026-10-18
• Stars: ★ 0 · Forks: 0
• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days
Source
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).
