Install verification: runtime verified (L5) · tested on dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 · last checked Install verification details →
What it does
DSH plugin orchestration and workspace-isolation manager: plugin scanning, per-workspace isolated instances, and a standalone rescue entry.
Installation
dsh plugin --profile web add github:Sum556677/dsh-workspace-orchestratorInstall method: GitHub · runtime verified (L5)
Verification & Compatibility
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
○ The author declares no dsh version requirement — install is not blocked by version.
| plugin \ dsh | dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 current |
|---|---|
| 233516 | ✓ |
233516github✓ 1 runtime-verified2026-10-19
https://github.com/Sum556677/dsh-workspace-orchestrator
✓dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-19L5 · runtime verified
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/Sum556677/dsh-workspace-orchestrator (version unstated)
ID: dsh-workspace-orchestrator@233516@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-19 · expires: 2026-10-26
View checks & evidence
active in loader tree (150 entries)
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
Author badges
Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-workspace-orchestrator/)``[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-workspace-orchestrator/)`Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static low, dynamic medium — stricter wins → overall medium.
v0.3.6dsh manifest0.3.6git2026-10-210.3.6same versionclean · npmVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (6)
- warningshellExec · shell
lib/orchestrator-core/src/paths.mjs:47const out = execFileSync('reg', ['query', root, '/s', '/f', 'DeepSeek Harness'], { - warningshellExec · shell
lib/orchestrator-core/src/probe.mjs:46execFile('taskkill', ['/pid', String(pid), '/T', '/F'], { windowsHide: true }, () => resolve(true)) - warningchildProcess · code-exec
lib/orchestrator-core/src/process.mjs:35const child = spawn(exe, args, { - warningchildProcess · code-exec
lib/orchestrator-core/src/process.mjs:112const child = spawn(exe, ['--expose-internals', cliJs, ...args], { - warningshellExec · shell
lib/orchestrator-core/src/process.mjs:204execFile('taskkill', ['/pid', String(pid), '/T', '/F'], { windowsHide: true }, () => resolve()) - warningchildProcess · code-exec
lib/orchestrator-core/verify-cli.mjs:28const child = spawn(process.execPath, [join(root, 'bin', 'rescue.mjs'), ...args], {
show 2 audit findings
- mediumUnescaped plugin id is interpolated into cordis.patch.yml, allowing YAML injection
lib/orchestrator-core/src/profile-patch.mjs:96A caller that passes an agent- or file-controlled plugin id containing newlines can inject arbitrary YAML rows into the profile patch. This can re-enable/disable plugins or alter config loaded by DSH; the exported disablePlugins API is intended for the declared manage_workspace_scope tool. The id is only trim()ed at line 112, so internal newlines survive.
- mediumscan_conflicts passes an unvalidated profile name as a dsh CLI option
lib/tools/conflicts.js:30The profile tool argument is only trimmed and then passed as an argv element to the official dsh CLI. A value starting with '--' (e.g. --patch=evil.yml) is parsed as a CLI option rather than a profile. If the corresponding profile directory exists (the same value is used to build cwd at line 115), the CLI can be made to load an attacker-selected patch/dump mode, contrary to the 'plugin code is never executed' claim. The CLI_REFUSED guard only rejects 'desktop'.
Two medium reachable weaknesses: unescaped plugin ids can inject YAML into profile patches, and scan_conflicts can pass option-like profile names into the dsh CLI; other child_process warnings are dev-only or shell-free.
Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-10-18 · activity: Active
• Repo created: 2026-10-18
• Stars: ★ 1 · Forks: 0
• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days
Source
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).
