This entry has been merged into: dsh-webgate-2 — verification records were moved there; this page is kept as an archive.
Install verification: sandbox install passed (L4) · runtime test (L5) pending · tested on dsh 0.1.1-rc.2 · last checked Install verification details →
Data as of (UTC)
What it doesAI
DSH remote access plugin allowing mobile/device access to local web UI via LAN, cloudflared, or frp tunnels.
- LAN direct access with QR code for same-network devices
- One-click cloudflared tunnel for temporary external access
- frp tunnel with own server, login portal and HTTPS
Capability tags are AI-inferred or rule-extracted from the README (see badge) — vocabulary-limited, not install-verified. AI = inferred; README = literal keyword from the readme.
Installation
dsh plugin --profile web add dsh-webgateInstall method: npm · sandbox install passed (L4) · runtime test (L5) pending · verified on dsh 0.1.1-rc.2
Trends
Four lines, four questions: total stars, stars gained this week, cumulative downloads, downloads this week. The GitHub pair comes from real-read sampling — a rotating daily shard, so one plugin is re-read roughly every 5–14 days, sparser than npm; the npm pair has a value on every snapshot day. The two cumulative panels are smoothed curves with no sample markers; the two weekly panels keep their raw bars and add a 4-week moving-average trend line that strips single-week noise down to the direction of travel.
current (registry 2026-11-16) · 0 samples; a smoothed curve through every sample — not a daily series
Only 0 points (< 3): no chart yet
no data yet
Bars = the delta between two samples 5–14 days apart (negative points down, faint bars contain reconstructed points); line = 4-week moving-average trend
Only 0 points (< 3): no chart yet
no data yet
Reconstructed backwards from the current total using daily downloads (gaps are not interpolated)
Only 0 points (< 3): no chart yet
no data yet
Bars = the snapshot’s last-week rolling window (official npm + npmmirror combined); line = 4-week moving-average trend — the shape of weekly demand, not a user count
08-19 → 08-26 · 5 points
Verification & Compatibility
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
○ The author declares no dsh version requirement — install is not blocked by version.
| plugin \ dsh | dsh 0.1.1-rc.2 |
|---|---|
| 0.2.3 | · |
0.2.3npm2026-08-24
dsh-webgate
No runtime install test for this version (static scan only) — compatibility unknown, never assumed.
Only the latest 3 published versions are shown; source-snapshot (commit hash) groups, unstated groups and older versions are omitted — the full archive stays in the data layer (snapshot/unstated groups appear only when a plugin has no published version).
Author badges
Embed the dsh.so badges in your README to show this plugin's automated security-scan and install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-webgate/?ref=badge)`dsh.so is an independent community project, not affiliated with or endorsed by DeepSeek AI. Badges are maintained by dsh.so; embed links carry a ?ref= attribution parameter.
Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static low; dynamic high (authoritative when present) → overall high.
v0.2.3dsh manifest0.2.3npm2026-08-260.2.3same versionclean · npmVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (4)
- criticalchildProcess · code-exec
lib/index.js:14import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; - warningnetIp · network
lib/index.js:220child = spawn(binary, ["tunnel", "--url", `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`, "--no-autoupdate"], { stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"] }); - warningnetIp · network
lib/index.js:372console.log(`dsh web: http://127.0.0.1:${port}`); - warningnetIp · network
lib/portal.js:114if (out.origin !== void 0) out.origin = "http://127.0.0.1:" + String(targetPort);
show 5 audit findings
- highDefault patch binds the server to 0.0.0.0 and trusts every LAN authority with no authentication
cordis.patch.yml:10Installing the bundle silently changes the web server from the base loopback bind to all interfaces (the CLI deliberately rejects --host 0.0.0.0) and makes every LAN IPv4/hostname a trusted authority for the /api browser-trust fence. The plugin's own boot text confirms the consequence: 'no authentication; anyone on this network can drive the agent (including running commands)'. Any device sharing the Wi-Fi/LAN (cafe, office, dorm, guest network) can open the GUI and drive the agent with shell execution; the optional auth portal is off by default and does not cover the LAN path.
- mediumui-settings bundle is patched to host persistence for every non-loopback origin
lib/index.js:465The served @deepseek-ai/dsh-client-ui-settings/client.js is rewritten so non-loopback pages use host persistence instead of a memory scope. The code justifies this with 'the auth portal is the trust boundary', but the patch is applied unconditionally, including the default LAN path where there is no authentication at all. If the /api fence (which cordis.patch.yml points at every LAN host) is what guards the settings APIs, an unauthenticated LAN peer could read/write persisted settings, contradicting the plugin's own claim that 'settings/credentials stay loopback-only by design'; if the guard r
- mediumUnauthenticated crash of the host process via malformed percent-encoding in the session cookie
lib/portal.js:97decodeURIComponent throws URIError on malformed input such as Cookie: dsh_session=%zz. cookieOf() is called by validSession() for every portal request, and the login body parser (line 137) does the same before authentication. The throw happens inside a request/'end' listener, i.e. an uncaught exception that terminates the whole DSH node process (the portal shares the process with the agent), giving any client that can reach the portal an unauthenticated denial of service.
- lowGuest tunnel hostname is auto-trusted, making the public link a full-control bearer credential
lib/index.js:202When tunnelEnabled is set, startTunnel() parses cloudflared output and announceTunnel() pushes the random trycloudflare.com hostname into connection.trustedHosts, so anyone who obtains that URL passes the /api fence and drives the agent without any authentication for as long as the tunnel lives. It is opt-in (default false) and the plugin prints a warning, but there is no portal in front of this path, and the URL leaks easily through QR screenshots, chat or logs.
- lowAuth session tokens stored on disk with default permissions and a 30-day lifetime
lib/portal.js:82Live login tokens for the privileged loopback-rewriting proxy are written to $DSH_HOME/auth-sessions.json (often ~/.dsh) with the process default mode (commonly 0644) and stay valid for 30 days with no rotation and no invalidation on password change. On a shared/multi-user machine another local user can read the file and reuse a token to obtain full agent + credentials-settings access through the portal.
Default config binds DSH to 0.0.0.0 and trusts every LAN authority with no authentication, so any same-network peer can drive the agent and run commands.
Rule (2026-10-28): when a dynamic conclusion exists it is authoritative (it may raise or lower the level); the static scan tier (vet primary, dsh backstop) applies only when there is none (not queued / audit failed / withdrawn). The audit never writes the exemption list (exemptions are manual only); a wrong conclusion is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static scan tier.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-08-16 · activity: Inactive
• Repo created: 2026-08-16
• Stars: ★ 8 · Forks: 0
• Health: Inactive — no commit in 90+ days
Source
GitHub: github.com/pppolf/dsh-webgate
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).
Frequently asked questions
What is dsh-webgate?
dsh-webgate is a DeepSeek Harness (dsh) plugin listed on dsh.so — an independent community registry that indexes public source repositories and publishes automated security-scan and install-verification results for each entry.
Is dsh.so or this plugin page official?
dsh.so is an independent community registry and is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by DeepSeek AI.
How do I install dsh-webgate?
Run dsh plugin --profile web add dsh-webgate in a DeepSeek Harness (dsh) environment. That exact command passed a real install inside an isolated sandbox (L4); the web smoke test (L5) has not passed yet.
How does the security scan relate to a manual audit?
Both layers are automated, not a manual audit. The static scan is heuristic analysis of the repository source, so it can produce false positives and miss context. The model-driven dynamic security audit only covers plugins static-flagged at warn or above, never executes plugin code, and its conclusion is authoritative when there is one (it may raise or lower the static tier); exemptions stay manual. Neither layer is an endorsement: review the repository and the permissions it asks for before installing, together with the verification level and health signals.
How fresh is the data on this page?
The data on this page is as of 2026-11-16 (UTC) — the most recent valid timestamp among the registry refresh, install verification, security scan and dynamic audit. Build time is never used as a data date.
