dsh-svn-tools

Any client that satisfies the API trust fence — i.e. a local process/script posting without an Origin header, or a page served from the same host:port — can make the DSH process spawn an arbitrary executable of its choosing (fixed args `--version --quiet`). Remote web pages are blocked by the Host/Origin fence, so this needs local access or a same-origin foothold, but it is a genuine arbitrary-program-execution primitive and it also discloses the probed path/version.

resolveTargetAbs returns absolute paths unchanged, so api.diffChoose rewrites an arbitrary file with fs.writeFile (a non-versioned target has left=null, so a block applied with mode 'left' silently drops those lines), while api.export (--force), api.checkout, api.delete, api.revert, api.patch and api.historyRevert act on paths outside the session workspace. historyRevert/repoRelTarget do enforce containment, the other write handlers do not. Reachable only through the trust-fenced API or the user's own agent tools, so the impact is local data destruction/overwrite rather than remote compromise.

fs.writeFile uses the process umask (typically 0o644), so on a shared multi-user host the commit log, svn property value, or streamed repository file content (dsh-svn-cat-*.tmp) is readable by other local users during the command window. The UUID-random file names make discovery unlikely, so no reachable exploit is demonstrated.