Install verification: Ecosystem plugin: installs via dsh plugin add but declares no dsh.bundle and mounts no plugin capability — the L1-L5 install ladder does not rate it; the security scan still runs.Install verification details →
What it does
DSH Web GUI 技能面板(dsh-skill-picker 的个人 fork):全量技能发现 + 全中文备注 + 8 类分类筛选 + 技能管理(置顶/关闭/定位/卸载可撤回),自带维护技能。不发布 npm,永不被上游覆盖。
Installation
dsh plugin --profile web add github:frzzaxszz/dsh-skill-catalog#v1.2.0Install method: GitHub · runtime test inconclusive (L5 unknown)
Verification & Compatibility○ Ecosystem plugin
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
package manifest not collected — the declared range is unknown.
| plugin \ dsh | dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 current |
|---|---|
| v1.2.0 | ○ |
v1.2.0github○ 1 ecosystem plugin2026-10-19
https://github.com/frzzaxszz/dsh-skill-catalog
○dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-19Ecosystem plugin
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/frzzaxszz/dsh-skill-catalog#v1.2.0
ID: dsh-skill-catalog@v1.2.0@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-19 · expires: 2026-10-26
View checks & evidence
not present in web-profile loader inventory
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
Author badges
Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-skill-catalog/)`Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static low, dynamic medium — stricter wins → overall medium.
—v1.2.0git2026-10-21v1.2.0same versionclean · gitVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (7)
- warningchildProcess · code-exec
plugin/lib/index.js:374spawn("explorer.exe", [`/select,${show}`], { detached: true, stdio: "ignore" }).unref(); - warningchildProcess · code-exec
plugin/lib/index.js:378spawn("open", ["-R", show], { detached: true, stdio: "ignore" }).unref(); - warningchildProcess · code-exec
plugin/lib/index.js:381spawn("xdg-open", [path3.dirname(show)], { detached: true, stdio: "ignore" }).unref(); - warningnetIp · network
plugin/scripts/check-categories.mjs:34const res = await fetch('http://127.0.0.1:19387/api/dsh-skill-explorer/list', { - warningchildProcess · code-exec
plugin/src/skill-ops.js:221spawn('explorer.exe', [`/select,${show}`], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' }).unref() - warningchildProcess · code-exec
plugin/src/skill-ops.js:225spawn('open', ['-R', show], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' }).unref() - warningchildProcess · code-exec
plugin/src/skill-ops.js:228spawn('xdg-open', [path.dirname(show)], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' }).unref()
show 4 audit findings
- mediumUnauthenticated skill route derives its path-containment roots from the client-supplied `cwd`
plugin/src/index.js:474The only authorization on POST /dsh-skill-catalog/skill is the CSRF-style header `x-dsh-skill-catalog: 1`, which any non-browser local client can set (the module's own comment says these routes sit outside the web server's auth gate). The containment check in resolveSkillPath is then run against roots built from the caller's cwd (allSkillRoots pushes `path.join(cwd, '.agents', 'skills')` and `path.join(cwd, '.dsh', 'skills')`), so the 'inside the user's skill roots' guarantee becomes 'inside any `<cwd>/.dsh/skills` or `<cwd>/.agents/skills` directory the caller names'. Actions then rename `SKI
- mediumStartup self-heal/revert writes patched JS into the official dsh-client-ui-skill package file
plugin/lib/index.js:191On every boot the plugin enumerates `$DSH_HOME/profiles/*/node_modules/@deepseek-ai/dsh-client-ui-skill/lib/client.js` (plus the desktop `resources/app/...` copy) and, when DSH_SKILL_CATALOG_FILE_PATCH=1, rewrites that official package file with a patched bundle containing injected hooks (`window.__dshSkillPickerFuzzy`, `window.__dshSkillPickerTrack`) that the web GUI then serves to browsers. With the flag unset (the default) the revert path runs instead and copies `<file>.dsh-skill-catalog.bak` back over client.js when a marker is found. The injected text is fixed and a backup is made before
- low`/dsh-skill-catalog/state` accepts writes without the client-header guard (cross-site POST reaches it)
plugin/src/index.js:416Unlike handleSkillOp, the shared-state handler never checks `x-dsh-skill-catalog`, and readJsonBody parses the raw stream regardless of content type. A cross-site HTML form or simple `fetch` POST (text/plain, no CORS preflight) therefore reaches it and overwrites $DSH_HOME/dsh-skill-catalog-state.json; any local client can also GET the stored pins/usage. The payload is normalized to strings and finite integers, so impact is limited to clobbering the pinned list and usage counters, not code execution or path control.
- lowUnauthenticated route can spawn the OS file manager via the reveal action
plugin/src/skill-ops.js:221The reveal action launches a detached process (explorer.exe, open -R, or xdg-open) from an HTTP route whose only gate is the trivially forgeable `x-dsh-skill-catalog` header. Arguments are passed as an array with no shell, and `show` is the server-resolved skill path from its own scan, so no command injection was found; the concrete effect is that any local caller can pop file-manager windows on the user's desktop and the process launch is outside the user's control.
No RCE or secret leakage found; residual risks are a skill route whose containment roots come from a client-supplied cwd, a CSRF-less state write, and startup patching of the official UI client file.
Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-10-18 · activity: Active
• Repo created: 2026-10-17
• Stars: ★ 0 · Forks: 0
• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days
Source
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).
