@Lequait/dsh-proxy-router

Both directFetch (line 90) and proxyFetch (line ~139) create TLS connections with rejectUnauthorized:false, so any HTTPS request made by proxy_router {action:'fetch'} can be silently intercepted/impersonated by an on-path attacker. Reachability is confirmed: action=fetch calls smart.fetch -> directFetch/proxyFetch. Practical impact is bounded because the response body is discarded (only status/bytes/ms are returned), but the integrity signal and the fact that the request target is disclosed to the MITM remain real.

When no local core is found, startRouterAuto/downloadCore fetches the mihomo release through the first working mirror (three third-party GitHub proxies are tried by default), accepts any payload larger than 1 MB, writes it, chmods it 493 and spawns it. There is no checksum/signature verification and the version is not pinned (latest release tag). A compromised or malicious mirror can therefore have arbitrary attacker code executed with the harness user's privileges. Precondition: a mirror serves a tampered artefact (or the official release channel is compromised).

directFetch/proxyFetch/httpGetBuffer/httpGetText accumulate the whole body into memory with no size cap, and httpGetBuffer follows redirects recursively without a hop limit. A hostile or misbehaving server (or a redirect loop) reachable via proxy_router action=fetch, or during kernel download, can exhaust memory or loop for a long time (a 240 s timeout applies to the download call).

rememberSubscription writes the full subscription URL, which typically contains a user token or UUID credential, to $DSH_HOME/cache/proxy-router/subscription.txt with default permissions. Any other process or user with read access to the home directory can recover the proxy credentials; the same secret is also written into the generated mihomo config.yaml.