Install verification: runtime verified (L5) · tested on dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 · last checked Install verification details →
What it does
One-click prompt rewriter in the DeepSeek Harness composer: three rewrite levels, follows the model you are already chatting with.
Installation
dsh plugin --profile web add dsh-prompt-crafterInstall method: GitHub · runtime verified (L5)
Verification & Compatibility
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
○ The author declares no dsh version requirement — install is not blocked by version.
| plugin \ dsh | dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 current |
|---|---|
| 1.2.2 | ✓ |
1.2.2npm✓ 1 runtime-verified2026-10-21
dsh-prompt-crafter
✓dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-21L5 · runtime verified
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
- • Plugin artifact: npm · dsh-prompt-crafter@1.2.2
ID: dsh-prompt-crafter@1.2.2@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l3-fullscan
Issued: 2026-10-21 · expires: 2026-10-28
View checks & evidence
active in loader tree (150 entries)
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
Only the latest 3 published versions are shown; source-snapshot (commit hash) groups, unstated groups and older versions are omitted — the full archive stays in the data layer (snapshot/unstated groups appear only when a plugin has no published version).
Author badges
Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-prompt-crafter/)``[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-prompt-crafter/)`Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static medium, dynamic medium — stricter wins → overall medium.
v1.2.2dsh manifestv1.2.2git2026-10-21v1.2.2same versionsuspicious · npmVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (1)
- criticalsecretSk · secrets
index.js:174|| 'sk-KF7KZR2M9xwq1rve7j7N0KYGgbmDfrwwuxrf2CI9Bvd7olPP',
show 3 audit findings
- mediumUser prompt drafts are transmitted to a third-party host (api.hcnsec.cn) that is never named in the UI
index.js:171When modelMode is 'free' (the highlighted default action of the first-run 'Free channel' toast sets exactly { modelMode: 'free' }), up to MAX_INPUT_CHARS=20000 chars of whatever the user typed are POSTed to an OpenAI-compatible endpoint outside the plugin repo's control/ownership, together with the plugin's bearer token. The settings UI displays only the model name and never the destination host, so the user cannot see where the draft goes. The /free-channel/test route additionally contacts this host on every settings-page open, leaking IP/timing.
- mediumA live API key is hardcoded in the published plugin bundle (extractable by every installer)
index.js:172The literal (redacted here by the harvester; present verbatim in the shipped file per the source comment『凭据内置在这里,等于对所有安装者公开』) is a bearer credential for api.hcnsec.cn distributed to every installer. Anyone can extract it from package/index.js and burn the quota or incur cost on the operator's account; it cannot be rotated without breaking all existing installs. It also sits next to an env-overridable baseURL, so an env-influencing attacker can redirect the same token to another host.
- mediumSettings and optimize HTTP routes have no auth/CSRF check and parse the JSON body regardless of Content-Type
index.js:480Because the handler ignores Content-Type and there is no token/origin check, a cross-origin 'simple' request (text/plain + JSON text, no preflight) from any web page the user visits can POST to the local DSH web server and rewrite plugin settings: force modelMode='free' (routing subsequent drafts to the external host), or set style='custom' with an attacker-authored customPrompt that becomes the system prompt for the user's next optimize call. The same applies to any local process. The optimize route is likewise unauthenticated and will spend the user's LLM quota on arbitrary 20k-char input.
No code execution or backdoor; real issues are a bundled third-party API key, user drafts sent to an external host, and unauthenticated settings/optimize HTTP routes (CSRF-able).
Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-10-18 · activity: Active
• Repo created: 2026-10-17
• Stars: ★ 0 · Forks: 0
• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days
Source
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).
