Install verification: Ecosystem plugin: installs via dsh plugin add but declares no dsh.bundle and mounts no plugin capability — the L1-L5 install ladder does not rate it; the security scan still runs.Install verification details →
What it doesAI
A low-code project panel for the DeepSeek Harness sidebar that shows the project tree, push status, source editing and pre-push checks in one place.
- MagicalCoder-style project tree with in-place rename, move and delete
- Push status ledger showing which pages and APIs are synced or changed
- Source tabs with highlighting plus pre-push static validation rules
Capability tags are AI-inferred or rule-extracted from the README (see badge) — vocabulary-limited, not install-verified. AI = inferred; README = literal keyword from the readme.
Installation
dsh plugin --profile web add github:lzqzm/dsh-project-panel#v0.2.28Install method: GitHub · runtime test inconclusive (L5 unknown)
Verification & Compatibility○ Ecosystem plugin
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
package manifest not collected — the declared range is unknown.
| plugin ＼ dsh | dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 current | dsh 0.2.1-alpha.4 | dsh 0.2.1-alpha.2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| v0.2.28 | ○ | ○ | ○ |
v0.2.28github○ 3 ecosystem plugin2026-10-19
https://github.com/lzqzm/dsh-project-panel
○dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-19Ecosystem plugin
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/lzqzm/dsh-project-panel#v0.2.28
ID: dsh-project-panel@v0.2.28@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-19 · expires: 2026-10-26
View checks & evidence
not present in web-profile loader inventory
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
○dsh 0.2.1-alpha.42026-10-16Ecosystem plugin
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-alpha.4
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/lzqzm/dsh-project-panel#v0.2.28
ID: dsh-project-panel@v0.2.28@dsh0.2.1-alpha.4 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-16 · expires: 2026-10-23
View checks & evidence
not present in web-profile loader inventory
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
○dsh 0.2.1-alpha.22026-10-15Ecosystem plugin
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-alpha.2
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/lzqzm/dsh-project-panel#v0.2.28
ID: dsh-project-panel@v0.2.28@dsh0.2.1-alpha.2 · profile: l3-fullscan
Issued: 2026-10-15 · expires: 2026-10-22
View checks & evidence
not present in web-profile loader inventory
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
Only the latest 3 published versions are shown; source-snapshot (commit hash) groups, unstated groups and older versions are omitted — the full archive stays in the data layer (snapshot/unstated groups appear only when a plugin has no published version).
Author badges
Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-project-panel/)`Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static low, dynamic medium — stricter wins → overall medium.
—v0.2.28git2026-10-21v0.2.28same versionclean · gitVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (3)
- criticalnewFunction · code-exec
lib/index.js:1161try { new Function(js); } catch (e) { - criticalnewFunction · code-exec
lib/index.js:1195try { new Function(script); } catch (e) { - warningchildProcess · code-exec
lib/index.js:829const child = spawn(process.execPath, [scriptPath, ...finalArgs], { cwd: scriptDir, shell: false });
show 4 audit findings
- mediumprojectWriteFile + projectRunScript compose into arbitrary host code execution for any authenticated RPC caller
lib/index.js:828runScript itself is hardened (script name restricted to /^source-[a-z0-9-]+\.js$/, argv passed as an array with shell:false, no shell metacharacter injection), but the same plugin can create the file: projectWriteFile writes arbitrary content to any path inside a registered workspace. Writing source-x.js and then calling projectRunScript therefore yields arbitrary JavaScript execution with the host process's privileges. The precondition is an authenticated call to the /api/desktopProject/* endpoints (which is also reachable from anything running in the app origin, see the preview finding).
- mediumAssembled page preview executes project HTML/JS as a same-origin blob document in a new tab
lib/client.jslib/index.js projectAssemblePreview inlines page.json/index.html/page.css/page.js verbatim into one HTML document (plus scripts fetched from the user-configured SERVER_URL and cdn.jsdelivr.net). The client opens that document as a blob: URL, which inherits the DSH app origin, so any page.js pulled from a remote platform (source-page-pull.js) or shipped in a cloned repo runs with the app's origin: it can read app storage, issue same-origin cookie-authenticated fetches, and call /api/desktopProject/* (including the write+run chain above). The docstring says the HTML is for an iframe srcdoc, but
- mediumPreset import writes package-supplied plugin declarations into the profile cordis.patch.yml
lib/index.js:228POST /api/agent-preset.import?install=1 takes a caller-supplied .dshpreset, parses preset/agent.cordis.yml and inserts its plugin list verbatim into the profile patch, which the DSH profile loader then executes at next boot. Zip handling itself is well hardened (path traversal filter, 16/32/12 MB and 512 file caps, manifest schema validation, !!js YAML tags preserved but not evaluated here). The residual risk is that the import path installs arbitrary plugin module names into persisted config, and the preview returned to the UI only reports pluginCount, not the plugin identifiers, so a malicio
- lowWorkspace containment checks do not resolve symlinks, allowing writes through links placed inside a workspace
lib/index.js:1015ownerOf()/normalizeForCompare() only compare normalized path strings; the code itself documents this ('已知局限：不解析符号链接/8.3 短名'). projectWriteFile/projectReadFile follow a symlink placed inside a workspace (e.g. brought in by a cloned repo) and can therefore read or overwrite a target file outside the workspace. Listing skips symlinks and rm() unlinks the link rather than the target, so the practical impact is limited to read/overwrite, and it needs a pre-existing link plus an authenticated caller.
No shell injection or zip/path escapes; residual risk is the write+run RPC chain (host code execution), same-origin project preview, and preset import writing plugin declarations.
Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-10-19 · activity: Active
• Repo created: 2026-10-07
• Stars: ★ 0 · Forks: 0
• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days
Source
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).