Install verification: runtime verified (L5) · tested on dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 · last checked Install verification details →
What it does
DSH 插件:电商平台店铺账号管理(拼多多/淘宝/天猫/抖音/京东/1688 商家端)—— 一店一份 Chrome 档案,登录一次长期复用;静默/定时检测登录态、保活续期、一键自更新
Installation
dsh plugin --profile web add github:monagisa/dsh-plugin-shop-accounts#v0.3.0Install method: GitHub · runtime verified (L5)
Verification & Compatibility
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
○ The author declares no dsh version requirement — install is not blocked by version.
| plugin \ dsh | dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 current | dsh 0.2.1-alpha.4 |
|---|---|---|
| v0.6.10 | · | · |
| v0.3.0 | ✓ | ✓ |
v0.6.10github2026-10-21
https://github.com/monagisa/dsh-plugin-shop-accounts
No runtime install test for this version (static scan only) — compatibility unknown, never assumed.
v0.3.0github✓ 2 runtime-verified2026-10-19
https://github.com/monagisa/dsh-plugin-shop-accounts
✓dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-19L5 · runtime verified
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/monagisa/dsh-plugin-shop-accounts#v0.3.0
ID: dsh-plugin-shop-accounts@v0.3.0@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-19 · expires: 2026-10-26
View checks & evidence
↳ carried from earlier record dsh-plugin-shop-accounts@v0.6.10@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 (l3-fullscan)
↳ carried from earlier record dsh-plugin-shop-accounts@v0.6.10@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 (l3-fullscan)
↳ carried from earlier record dsh-plugin-shop-accounts@v0.6.10@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 (l3-fullscan)
active in loader tree (150 entries)
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
✓dsh 0.2.1-alpha.42026-10-18L5 · runtime verified
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-alpha.4
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/monagisa/dsh-plugin-shop-accounts#v0.3.0
ID: dsh-plugin-shop-accounts@v0.3.0@dsh0.2.1-alpha.4 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-18 · expires: 2026-10-25
View checks & evidence
↳ carried from earlier record dsh-plugin-shop-accounts@v0.6.10@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 (l3-fullscan)
↳ carried from earlier record dsh-plugin-shop-accounts@v0.6.10@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 (l3-fullscan)
↳ carried from earlier record dsh-plugin-shop-accounts@v0.6.10@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 (l3-fullscan)
active in loader tree (150 entries)
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
Author badges
Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-plugin-shop-accounts/)``[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-plugin-shop-accounts/)`Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static low, dynamic medium — stricter wins → overall medium.
v0.6.10dsh manifestv0.6.10git2026-10-21v0.6.10same versionclean · gitVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (12)
- warningnetIp · network
lib/cdp.mjs:25const res = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}${pathname}`, { - warningnetIp · network
lib/cdp.mjs:77const res = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/json/new?${encodeURIComponent(url)}`, { - warningnetIp · network
lib/cdp.mjs:92const res = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/json/close/${encodeURIComponent(targetId)}`, { - warningchildProcess · code-exec
lib/chrome.mjs:98const child = spawn(exe, args, { - warningshellExec · shell
lib/chrome.mjs:117execFile( - warningshellExec · shell
lib/chrome.mjs:145execFile( - warningchildProcess · code-exec
lib/index.js:255const r = spawnSync('git', ['-C', dir, ...args], { - warningchildProcess · code-exec
lib/index.js:1355const child = spawn('explorer.exe', [dir], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' }); - warningnetIp · network
lib/index.js:812return { port: pinned, pid: 0, reused: true, profileDir: dir, mode, cdpUrl: `http://127.0.0.1:${pinned}`, browser: exe, urls }; - warningnetIp · network
lib/index.js:843return { port, pid, reused: false, profileDir: dir, mode, cdpUrl: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`, browser: exe, urls }; - warningnetIp · network
lib/index.js:1019cdpUrl: port ? `http://127.0.0.1:${port}` : '', - warningfsWrite · files
lib/index.js:56fs.appendFileSync(file, JSON.stringify({ ts: new Date().toISOString(), tag, ...payload }) + '\n', 'utf8');
show 3 audit findings
- mediumreset recursively deletes an arbitrary configured profileDir with no path containment check
lib/chrome.mjs:173`removeProfileDir` deletes whatever path it is given. `resetAccount` (lib/index.js) passes `accountProfileDir(account, cfg)` straight through, and that value is either the import path supplied at account creation or an editable `profileDir` (PUT /accounts/:id). The UI explicitly invites pointing it at a real Chrome user directory ("填入已登录过的 Chrome 用户目录…例如 D:\\store-browser\\chrome-profile"), so a reset — reachable via POST /accounts/:id/reset and via the `shop_accounts` tool with action=reset, which needs no UI confirmation — can wipe an entire real browser profile (and, with `force:true`, the
- mediumChrome launched with --remote-allow-origins=* exposes CDP control of logged-in merchant sessions to any local origin
lib/chrome.mjs:86Every launch (login window, work window and the headless probe) disables Chrome's Origin check on the DevTools WebSocket, and the debugging port keeps running with a profile that holds live merchant cookies (Pinduoduo/Taobao/Douyin/JD/1688). Any page or process that can reach the loopback port and learns a target's webSocketDebuggerUrl can attach, call Network.getAllCookies / Runtime.evaluate, and act as the logged-in merchant. Chrome's loopback bind and its non-localhost Host-header rejection limit this to local origins/processes, but the plugin removes the origin lockout for every account it
- lowState-changing HTTP routes have no Origin/CSRF check and fall back to an empty body on parse failure
lib/index.jsThe /shop-accounts prefix handler performs no Origin/Sec-Fetch-Site check and does not require a JSON content type for actions: a body that is not JSON is silently replaced by {} for open/close/finish/reset. A cross-site form POST (text/plain or form-urlencoded, no preflight) to /shop-accounts/accounts/<id>/{open,finish,close,reset} therefore still executes if the host web server does not add its own auth — launching browsers, running headless probes, or (combined with the finding above) deleting a profile. Exploitation needs the host port and a valid account id, so this is CSRF-shaped rather
No exfiltration or shell injection, but reset recursively deletes an unvalidated configurable profile dir and Chrome runs with --remote-allow-origins=* over logged-in merchant sessions.
Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-10-19 · activity: Active
• Repo created: 2026-10-17
• Stars: ★ 0 · Forks: 1
• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days
Source
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).
