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@renger185/dsh-phone-remote

手机远程操控 DSH：手机浏览器原生页面 + 限时门 + 企微机器人长连接

PluginBrowser
Verification
L4 · Install tested
Failed
Risk
Critical
Health
Active
Trust
Silver

Install verification: sandbox install ok, web smoke failed (L5) · tested on dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 · last checked Install verification details →

What it does

手机远程操控 DSH：手机浏览器原生页面 + 限时门 + 企微机器人长连接

Installation

dsh plugin --profile web add github:renger185/dsh-phone-remote
verified

Install method: GitHub · sandbox install ok, web smoke failed (L5)

Verification & Compatibility

Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.

External credentials (plugin-level): none detected

Declared DSH compatibilityfrom package.json · peerDependencies
author declared no dsh version requirement

○ The author declares no dsh version requirement — install is not blocked by version.

Install compatibility matrix (rows = plugin versions〔latest 5〕, columns = dsh versions〔latest 5〕)
At-a-glance → evidence in the cards below
plugin ＼ dshdsh 0.2.1-rc.2
v0.3.0·
Install compatibility (by plugin version, dsh versions within)
Legend:✓ L5 runtime verified○ ecosystem plugin◼ ecosystem app✗ failed
v0.3.0github2026-10-21

https://github.com/renger185/dsh-phone-remote

No runtime install test for this version (static scan only) — compatibility unknown, never assumed.

Only the latest 3 published versions are shown; source-snapshot (commit hash) groups, unstated groups and older versions are omitted — the full archive stays in the data layer (snapshot/unstated groups appear only when a plugin has no published version).

Author badges

Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:

dsh.so risk
`[![dsh.so risk](https://www.dsh.so/badge/dsh-phone-remote-2.svg)](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-phone-remote-2/)`

Security Report

Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.

dsh-phone-remote-2Automated review · daily

Static low, dynamic high — stricter wins → overall high.

static low→dynamic high→overall high
0 critical·0 high
highoverall · high
1static scan · vet primaryvet AST static analysis (npm artifact or git source)
Version binding
plugin versionv0.3.0dsh manifest
scanned versionv0.3.0git2026-10-21
current versionv0.3.0same version
vet verdictclean · git

Vet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).

show static findings (10)
  • warningchildProcess · code-execcompanion/phone-proxy-supervisor.mjs:53

    child = spawn(process.execPath, [PROXY], { stdio: 'inherit', cwd: HERE, windowsHide: true })

  • warningfsWrite · filescompanion/phone-proxy-supervisor.mjs:22

    fs.appendFileSync(SUPERVISOR_LOG, text + '\n', 'utf8')

  • warningfsWrite · filescompanion/phone-proxy.mjs:36

    fs.appendFileSync(LOG_FILE, `[${new Date().toISOString()}] ${line}\n`, 'utf8')

  • warningchildProcess · code-execcompanion/temp-door.mjs:146

    const child = spawn(cloudflared, ['tunnel', '--url', `http://127.0.0.1:${PROXY_PORT}`, '--no-autoupdate'], {

  • warningnetIp · networkcompanion/temp-door.mjs:146

    const child = spawn(cloudflared, ['tunnel', '--url', `http://127.0.0.1:${PROXY_PORT}`, '--no-autoupdate'], {

  • warningfsWrite · filescompanion/temp-door.mjs:56

    fs.appendFileSync(LOG_FILE, text + '\n', 'utf8')

  • warningfsWrite · filescompanion/temp-door.mjs:249

    fs.writeFileSync(STATE_FILE, JSON.stringify({

  • warningchildProcess · code-execcompanion/wecom-bot.mjs:55

    const child = spawn(process.execPath, [path.join(HERE, 'temp-door.mjs'), '--minutes', String(minutes)], {

  • warningfsWrite · filescompanion/wecom-bot.mjs:40

    fs.appendFileSync(LOG_FILE, text + '\n', 'utf8')

  • warningchildProcess · code-execindex.js:104

    const child = spawn(process.execPath, [doorScript, '--minutes', String(doorMinutes), '--quiet'], {

2dynamic auditmodel reads redacted source context · never executes plugin code
highest gradehigh
merged intooverall high
audited at2026-10-19
findings0 critical·2 high3 medium / 0 low hidden
show 5 audit findings
  • highCompanion proxy on 0.0.0.0 redirects any unauthenticated caller to the live auth tokencompanion/phone-proxy.mjs:92

    currentToken() reads the same connection token the plugin writes to login-link.txt, i.e. the full-access credential the Harness exchanges for a 30-day cookie. Because the listener is bound to '0.0.0.0' (line 151), any host on the LAN, or anyone reaching the port through temp-door/Tailscale, can GET / and be handed the token without any credential, then trade it for an authenticated session - a complete authentication bypass.

  • hightemp-door publishes the token-leaking proxy to the public internet via cloudflaredcompanion/temp-door.mjs:122

    The file comment claims '没有登录钥匙进不去，但能看到登录页', but the tunnel points at phone-proxy which auto-issues ?token= to any unauthenticated GET /. During the 30-minute window any internet user who obtains or guesses the trycloudflare URL (posted into WeCom chat history) gets full Harness control. The claimed safety property does not hold.

  • mediumProxy rewrites Host and Origin to defeat Harness' loopback trust checkcompanion/phone-proxy.mjs:82

    The Harness' Host/Origin validation is the main defense against DNS-rebinding and cross-site WebSocket hijacking. By forcing both to 127.0.0.1:<upstream> and stripping forwarded-for headers, the proxy makes every request look same-origin, so browser-based cross-origin attacks against the exposed port are no longer detectable upstream.

  • mediumWeCom chat text containing 开门 remotely opens a public tunnelcompanion/wecom-bot.mjs:82

    Any principal able to message the bot (any member of the group the bot is installed in, and potentially anyone who can reach it) triggers spawn of temp-door and gets the public URL published back into the conversation. There is no sender-id allowlist, no confirmation, and no rate limit, so the exposure window can be re-triggered indefinitely.

  • mediumPlugin pushes the raw connection token into a third-party webhook / chat historyindex.js:139

    `link` is ctx.connection.authenticatedUrl(base), i.e. it embeds the process connection token. It is POSTed to the configured WeCom webhook (or ntfy) on every activation, so the full-control credential is stored in group chat history and in a third-party service, readable by anyone with access to that channel and valid until the token rotates.

Host plugin itself is benign, but shipped companion proxy exposes the Harness on 0.0.0.0 and hands the auth token to any unauthenticated caller, and temp-door publishes that to the internet.

Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.

Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.

Activity

Last commit 2026-10-21 · activity: Active

• Repo created: 2026-10-18

• Stars: ★ 1 · Forks: 0

• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days

Source

GitHub: github.com/renger185/dsh-phone-remote

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