Install verification: runtime verified (L5) · tested on dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 · last checked Install verification details →
What it does
DSH plugin: talk to your DeepSeek Harness from your phone. Send text and photos, read replies as they stream — across any network via your own Tailscale tailnet. 用手机跟电脑上的 DSH 对话,不同 Wi-Fi 也能用。
Installation
dsh plugin --profile web add github:chs-1108/dsh-phone-bridge#v1.1.2Install method: GitHub · runtime verified (L5)
Verification & Compatibility
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
○ The author declares no dsh version requirement — install is not blocked by version.
| plugin \ dsh | dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 current | dsh 0.2.1-alpha.4 |
|---|---|---|
| v1.1.2 | ✓ | · |
v1.1.2github✓ 1 runtime-verified2026-10-21
https://github.com/chs-1108/dsh-phone-bridge
✓dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-21L5 · runtime verified
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/chs-1108/dsh-phone-bridge#v1.1.2
ID: dsh-phone-bridge-2@v1.1.2@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l3-fullscan
Issued: 2026-10-21 · expires: 2026-10-28
View checks & evidence
active in loader tree (150 entries)
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
Only the latest 3 published versions are shown; source-snapshot (commit hash) groups, unstated groups and older versions are omitted — the full archive stays in the data layer (snapshot/unstated groups appear only when a plugin has no published version).
Author badges
Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-phone-bridge-2/)``[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-phone-bridge-2/)`Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static low, dynamic medium — stricter wins → overall medium.
v1.1.0dsh manifestv1.1.2git2026-10-21v1.1.2same versionclean · gitVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (5)
- warningchildProcessImport · code-exec
index.js:19import { spawn } from 'node:child_process' - warningnetIp · network
index.js:988const url = new URL(req.url || '/', 'http://127.0.0.1') - warningnetIp · network
index.js:1036const svg = qrSvg(pairUrl() || `http://127.0.0.1:${bridge.tunnel.port()}${ROUTE_PREFIX}/`) - warningfsWrite · files
index.js:73fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, 'state.json'), JSON.stringify(state, null, 2), 'utf8') - warningfsWrite · files
index.js:153fs.writeFileSync(jobsFile(), JSON.stringify(capped, null, 2), 'utf8')
show 3 audit findings
- mediumLoopback-admin bypass plus content-type-agnostic JSON body enables cross-site driving of the agent
index.js:231Any web page opened in a browser on the same machine (or a DNS-rebinding page) can POST a text/plain JSON body to http://127.0.0.1:<port>/phone-bridge/api/send or /api/prefs. The request comes from 127.0.0.1, so it is treated as the local admin and no token is required, and readJson parses the body regardless of Content-Type, so no CORS preflight is triggered. The attacker cannot read the response but can blindly inject arbitrary prompts into the DSH agent, change the target session and set an arbitrary working directory (state.cwd).
- mediumRuntime-loaded vendored QR module and phone page were not included in the audited source
index.js:262package.json lists "vendor" and "web" in files, and index.js executes ./vendor/qrcode.cjs in-process with full plugin privileges (webServer registration, sessionController access) while serving web/app.html to the phone. Neither file was harvested, so their behaviour cannot be verified; a compromised or backdoored vendored module would run with plugin authority and is reachable on every /qr.svg or status call.
- lowPairing token accepted and emitted in URL query strings
index.js:238The bearer token may be supplied as ?token=/?k= and the settings panel loads /phone-bridge/qr.svg?token=<token>. Query strings end up in server access logs, browser history and any proxy/Tailscale logging, widening exposure of the single long-lived credential that grants full agent control.
Token auth is solid for remote clients, but any page in a local browser can drive the loopback-admin API (no CSRF/content-type check), and a vendored QR module runs unaudited.
Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-10-17 · activity: Active
• Repo created: 2026-10-17
• Stars: ★ 1 · Forks: 0
• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days
Source
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).
