Install verification: runtime verified (L5) · tested on dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 · last checked Install verification details →
What it doesAI
Toggle in DSH to continue your session from a phone browser via a local 127.0.0.1 reverse proxy and Cloudflare tunnel, with WeChat push.
- Local reverse proxy rewrites Host to loopback and passes WebSocket upgrades
- Cloudflare tunnel gives a random public URL without opening inbound ports
- WeChat push notifications plus real-time two-way message sync
Capability tags are AI-inferred or rule-extracted from the README (see badge) — vocabulary-limited, not install-verified. AI = inferred; README = literal keyword from the readme.
Installation
dsh plugin --profile web add github:Hongjun1-RGB/dsh-phone-access#v0.1.2Install method: GitHub · runtime verified (L5)
Verification & Compatibility
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
○ The author declares no dsh version requirement — install is not blocked by version.
| plugin \ dsh | dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 current |
|---|---|
| v0.1.2 | ✓ |
| v0.1.0 | · |
v0.1.2github✓ 1 runtime-verified2026-10-20
https://github.com/Hongjun1-RGB/dsh-phone-access
✓dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-20L5 · runtime verified
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/Hongjun1-RGB/dsh-phone-access#v0.1.2
ID: dsh-phone-access@v0.1.2@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-20 · expires: 2026-10-27
View checks & evidence
active in loader tree (150 entries)
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
v0.1.0github2026-10-15
https://github.com/Hongjun1-RGB/dsh-phone-access
No runtime install test for this version (static scan only) — compatibility unknown, never assumed.
Author badges
Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-phone-access/)``[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-phone-access/)`Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static low, dynamic medium — stricter wins → overall medium.
v0.1.2dsh manifestv0.1.2git2026-10-21v0.1.2same versionclean · gitVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (7)
- warningchildProcess · code-exec
lib/index.js:316const child = spawn(bin, args, { stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'], windowsHide: true }) - warningshellExec · shell
lib/index.js:89const out = execFileSync(which, ['cloudflared'], { encoding: 'utf8', stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'] }) - warningshellExec · shell
lib/index.js:113execFileSync('tar', ['-xzf', tmp, '-C', DATA_DIR], { stdio: 'ignore' }) - warningnetIp · network
lib/index.js:315const args = ['tunnel', '--url', `http://127.0.0.1:${proxyPort}`, '--no-autoupdate', '--protocol', 'http2'] - warningfsWrite · files
lib/index.js:111fs.writeFileSync(tmp, buf) - warningfsWrite · files
lib/index.js:117fs.chmodSync(extracted, 0o755) - warningfsWrite · files
lib/index.js:120fs.writeFileSync(dest, buf)
show 4 audit findings
- mediumcloudflared binary is downloaded from releases/latest and executed without any checksum or signature check
lib/index.js:108The URL is 'https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared/releases/latest/download/...' — mutable 'latest' tag, no sha256/signature verification. Whatever that asset contains is written into ~/.dsh/remote-access, made executable and spawned by startTunnel with the user's privileges. A compromised or replaced release asset (or a TLS/release-pipeline issue) becomes local code execution. The same applies to the macOS .tgz path, which is additionally extracted with `tar -xzf` into DATA_DIR.
- medium/__auth hands a valid 30-day DSH session cookie to anyone who reaches the tunnel URL
lib/index.js:217The proxy's /__auth branch performs no authentication at all: any request that carries a trycloudflare hostname is redirected to '/' with a freshly minted, loopback-authority session cookie valid for 30 days. state.url is exactly `https://<host>/__auth`, so the tunnel link is a pure bearer credential for the entire DSH session (chat, /api, plugin routes that verifyCookie accepts). Anyone who obtains the link — forwarded chat message, browser history, or the third-party push provider the URL is sent to — gets the same access as the desktop user until the tunnel is turned off/rotated.
- lowProxy rewrites Host to loopback and strips Origin/Referer/Sec-Fetch-* for all tunnel traffic
lib/index.js:206This deliberately defeats DSH's Host trust fence and its cross-site request signals for everything arriving through the tunnel, so the upstream sees every tunnelled request as a trusted same-origin loopback call. It is required for the feature to work, but it means no CSRF / Origin defence remains on the tunnelled path — the only remaining gate is the cookie issued by /__auth.
- lowPlugin reads the DSH browser-session signing key from .credentials.yaml and gains cookie-forging capability
lib/index.js:135The plugin loads the persistent HMAC secret used to sign DSH browser-session cookies into its own process memory (secretCache) and can mint cookies for any authority it chooses. Nothing shows the key being written out or sent anywhere, but any future bug or malicious update in this plugin (or in ui/ui.js running on the DSH origin) would have signing-key access rather than only URL access.
Tunnel link is a bearer credential for the whole DSH session, and an unchecked cloudflared binary is downloaded and executed; plugin routes themselves are cookie-authenticated.
Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-10-15 · activity: Active
• Repo created: 2026-10-14
• Stars: ★ 1 · Forks: 0
• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days
Source
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).
