@Hongjun1-RGB/dsh-phone-access avatar

@Hongjun1-RGB/dsh-phone-access

DSH 插件:在界面里拨一个开关,用手机浏览器继续当前会话(内嵌反向代理 + Cloudflare 隧道 + 微信推送)

PluginNetworkBrowserUI & SkinsNotifications
Verification
L5 · Run tested
Verified
Risk
LowRisk
Health
Active
Trust
Gold

Install verification: runtime verified (L5) · tested on dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 · last checked Install verification details →

Install verification badge dsh 0.2.1-rc.2

What it doesAI

Toggle in DSH to continue your session from a phone browser via a local 127.0.0.1 reverse proxy and Cloudflare tunnel, with WeChat push.

  • Local reverse proxy rewrites Host to loopback and passes WebSocket upgrades
  • Cloudflare tunnel gives a random public URL without opening inbound ports
  • WeChat push notifications plus real-time two-way message sync
networkAInotificationAI

Capability tags are AI-inferred or rule-extracted from the README (see badge) — vocabulary-limited, not install-verified. AI = inferred; README = literal keyword from the readme.

Installation

dsh plugin --profile web add github:Hongjun1-RGB/dsh-phone-access#v0.1.2
verified v0.1.2

Install method: GitHub · runtime verified (L5)

Verification & Compatibility

Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.

External credentials (plugin-level): none detected

Declared DSH compatibilityfrom package.json · peerDependencies
author declared no dsh version requirement

○ The author declares no dsh version requirement — install is not blocked by version.

Install compatibility matrix (rows = plugin versions〔latest 5〕, columns = dsh versions〔latest 5〕)
At-a-glance → evidence in the cards below
plugin \ dshdsh 0.2.1-rc.2
current
v0.1.2✓
v0.1.0·
Install compatibility (by plugin version, dsh versions within)
Legend:✓ L5 runtime verified○ ecosystem plugin◼ ecosystem app✗ failed
v0.1.2github✓ 1 runtime-verified2026-10-20

https://github.com/Hongjun1-RGB/dsh-phone-access

✓dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-20L5 · runtime verified
Environment & artifact
  • • Node.js: v24.14.0
  • • DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
  • • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/Hongjun1-RGB/dsh-phone-access#v0.1.2
Levels (L1–L3 plugin-level static archive · L4/L5 newest real verdicts for this combination)
L1 static
Passed
L2 static
Passed
L3 static
Passed
L4 sandbox
Passed
L5 runtime
Passed
Install + runtime smoke verified in the dsh sandbox — installs and runs
L5 · runtime verified · valid for dsh 0.2.1-rc.2

ID: dsh-phone-access@v0.1.2@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l4-sandbox

Issued: 2026-10-20 · expires: 2026-10-27

View checks & evidence
L1 · Found✓ Passed
Defaulted from L3✓ Passed
defaulted to passed — L3 install spec passed (full-registry L3 sweep policy)
L2 · Structured✓ Passed
Defaulted from L3✓ Passed
defaulted to passed — L3 install spec passed (full-registry L3 sweep policy)
L3 · Install spec✓ Passed
Install command parsed✓ Passed
Source: registry verification · Method: install spec parse · Captured 2026-10-18
DSH version declared✓ Passed
Source: registry verification · Method: DSH version declaration · Captured 2026-10-18
L4 · Install tested✓ Passed
Install executed in confined sandbox✓ Passed
Source: Windows ACL sandbox · Method: sandbox install run · Captured 2026-10-20
spec github:Hongjun1-RGB/dsh-phone-access#v0.1.2 · channel GitHub source · outcome ran · exit 0
check took: 1.8s
Install succeeded✓ Passed
Source: Windows ACL sandbox · Method: sandbox install run · Captured 2026-10-20
spec github:Hongjun1-RGB/dsh-phone-access#v0.1.2 · channel GitHub source · outcome ran · exit 0
check took: 1.8s
Installed artifact confirmed✓ Passed
Source: Windows ACL sandbox · Method: sandbox install run · Captured 2026-10-20
spec github:Hongjun1-RGB/dsh-phone-access#v0.1.2 · channel GitHub source · outcome ran · exit 0
check took: 1.8s
L5 · Run tested✓ Passed

active in loader tree (150 entries)

Sandbox install passed✓ Passed
Source: Windows ACL sandbox · Method: sandbox install run · Captured 2026-10-20
spec github:Hongjun1-RGB/dsh-phone-access#v0.1.2 · install mode reused L4 scratch
check took: 116ms
Web boot ready✓ Passed
Source: DSH runtime · Method: web boot · Captured 2026-10-20
ready line dsh web: http://127.0.0.1:50307/?token=…
HTTP endpoint served✓ Passed
Source: DSH runtime · Method: HTTP request · Captured 2026-10-20
path / · HTTP 200 · took 116ms
Plugin active in inventory✓ Passed
Source: DSH runtime · Method: plugin inventory query · Captured 2026-10-20
verdict active · entries 150
match: include:phone-access · dsh-phone-access · phase active
phases: active 122 · null 28

L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.

v0.1.0github2026-10-15

https://github.com/Hongjun1-RGB/dsh-phone-access

No runtime install test for this version (static scan only) — compatibility unknown, never assumed.

Author badges

Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:

dsh.so risk
`[![dsh.so risk](https://www.dsh.so/badge/dsh-phone-access.svg)](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-phone-access/)`
dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 install verified
`[![dsh.so install · dsh 0.2.1-rc.2](https://www.dsh.so/badge/install/dsh-phone-access@0.2.1-rc.2.svg)](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-phone-access/)`

Security Report

Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.

dsh-phone-accessAutomated review · daily

Static low, dynamic medium — stricter wins → overall medium.

static low→dynamic medium→overall medium
0 critical·0 high
mediumoverall · medium
1static scan · vet primaryvet AST static analysis (npm artifact or git source)
plugin versionv0.1.2dsh manifest
scanned versionv0.1.2git2026-10-21
current versionv0.1.2same version
vet verdictclean · git

Vet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).

show static findings (7)
  • warningchildProcess · code-execlib/index.js:316

    const child = spawn(bin, args, { stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'], windowsHide: true })

  • warningshellExec · shelllib/index.js:89

    const out = execFileSync(which, ['cloudflared'], { encoding: 'utf8', stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'] })

  • warningshellExec · shelllib/index.js:113

    execFileSync('tar', ['-xzf', tmp, '-C', DATA_DIR], { stdio: 'ignore' })

  • warningnetIp · networklib/index.js:315

    const args = ['tunnel', '--url', `http://127.0.0.1:${proxyPort}`, '--no-autoupdate', '--protocol', 'http2']

  • warningfsWrite · fileslib/index.js:111

    fs.writeFileSync(tmp, buf)

  • warningfsWrite · fileslib/index.js:117

    fs.chmodSync(extracted, 0o755)

  • warningfsWrite · fileslib/index.js:120

    fs.writeFileSync(dest, buf)

2model reads redacted source context · never executes plugin code
highest grademedium
merged intooverall medium
audited at2026-10-19
findings0 critical·0 high2 medium / 2 low hidden
show 4 audit findings
  • mediumcloudflared binary is downloaded from releases/latest and executed without any checksum or signature checklib/index.js:108

    The URL is 'https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared/releases/latest/download/...' — mutable 'latest' tag, no sha256/signature verification. Whatever that asset contains is written into ~/.dsh/remote-access, made executable and spawned by startTunnel with the user's privileges. A compromised or replaced release asset (or a TLS/release-pipeline issue) becomes local code execution. The same applies to the macOS .tgz path, which is additionally extracted with `tar -xzf` into DATA_DIR.

  • medium/__auth hands a valid 30-day DSH session cookie to anyone who reaches the tunnel URLlib/index.js:217

    The proxy's /__auth branch performs no authentication at all: any request that carries a trycloudflare hostname is redirected to '/' with a freshly minted, loopback-authority session cookie valid for 30 days. state.url is exactly `https://<host>/__auth`, so the tunnel link is a pure bearer credential for the entire DSH session (chat, /api, plugin routes that verifyCookie accepts). Anyone who obtains the link — forwarded chat message, browser history, or the third-party push provider the URL is sent to — gets the same access as the desktop user until the tunnel is turned off/rotated.

  • lowProxy rewrites Host to loopback and strips Origin/Referer/Sec-Fetch-* for all tunnel trafficlib/index.js:206

    This deliberately defeats DSH's Host trust fence and its cross-site request signals for everything arriving through the tunnel, so the upstream sees every tunnelled request as a trusted same-origin loopback call. It is required for the feature to work, but it means no CSRF / Origin defence remains on the tunnelled path — the only remaining gate is the cookie issued by /__auth.

  • lowPlugin reads the DSH browser-session signing key from .credentials.yaml and gains cookie-forging capabilitylib/index.js:135

    The plugin loads the persistent HMAC secret used to sign DSH browser-session cookies into its own process memory (secretCache) and can mint cookies for any authority it chooses. Nothing shows the key being written out or sent anywhere, but any future bug or malicious update in this plugin (or in ui/ui.js running on the DSH origin) would have signing-key access rather than only URL access.

Tunnel link is a bearer credential for the whole DSH session, and an unchecked cloudflared binary is downloaded and executed; plugin routes themselves are cookie-authenticated.

Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.

Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.

Activity

Last commit 2026-10-15 · activity: Active

• Repo created: 2026-10-14

• Stars: ★ 1 · Forks: 0

• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days

Source

GitHub: github.com/Hongjun1-RGB/dsh-phone-access

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