Native DSH (cordis) plugin port of the openjev-browser MCP stdio tool: model-driven browser control with a tiny context footprint. A local OpenJev decision model reads the page and returns only the one element that matters, so the agent never ingests the DOM.
Install verification: sandbox install ok, web smoke failed (L5) · tested on dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 · last checked Install verification details →
What it doesAI
Native DSH port of openjev-browser that lets a local decision model drive a browser and return only the single relevant page element.
- Model-driven browser control with a tiny context footprint
- Local OpenJev model reads the page and picks the one element that matters
- Agent never ingests the full DOM, saving tokens
Capability tags are AI-inferred or rule-extracted from the README (see badge) — vocabulary-limited, not install-verified. AI = inferred; README = literal keyword from the readme.
Installation
dsh plugin --profile web add github:belowthetree/dsh-openjev-browserInstall method: GitHub · sandbox install ok, web smoke failed (L5)
Verification & Compatibility
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
○ The author declares no dsh version requirement — install is not blocked by version.
| plugin ＼ dsh | dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 current | dsh 0.2.1-alpha.2 |
|---|---|---|
| a683b7 | ✗ | ✗ |
a683b7github2 failed2026-10-21
https://github.com/belowthetree/dsh-openjev-browser
✗dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-21L5 · failed
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/belowthetree/dsh-openjev-browser (version unstated)
ID: dsh-openjev-browser@a683b7@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-21 · expires: 2026-10-28
View checks & evidence
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
✗dsh 0.2.1-alpha.22026-10-13L5 · failed
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-alpha.2
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/belowthetree/dsh-openjev-browser (version unstated)
ID: dsh-openjev-browser@a683b7@dsh0.2.1-alpha.2 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-13 · expires: 2026-10-20
View checks & evidence
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
Author badges
Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-openjev-browser/)`Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static low, dynamic medium — stricter wins → overall medium.
v0.1.0dsh manifest0.1.0git2026-10-210.1.0same versionclean · npmVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (5)
- warningnetIp · network
scripts/smoke.mjs:35apply(ctx, { openjevUrl: 'http://127.0.0.1:9' }) // unreachable on purpose - warningnetIp · network
src/index.ts:50openjevUrl: str('openjevUrl', 'http://127.0.0.1:8080'), - warningchildProcess · code-exec
src/runtime.ts:84const probe = spawnSync(pythonExe, ['-c', TMP_PROBE], { - warningnetIp · network
src/setup.ts:43openjevUrl: flags.url ?? process.env.OPENJEV_URL ?? 'http://127.0.0.1:8080', - warningnetIp · network
src/setup.ts:60--url <http://host:port> Decision service URL (default http://127.0.0.1:8080)
show 2 audit findings
- mediumUnauthenticated loopback settings API accepts arbitrary pythonPath that is executed as a subprocess
src/api.ts:184The /dsh-openjev-browser/api routes are gated only by isLoopbackRequest (source IP 127.0.0.1/::1), and sanitizeSettings stores any string as pythonPath without validation. src/runtime.ts calls spawnSync(pythonExe, ['-c', TMP_PROBE], ...) and setup.ts/model.status use pythonPath to probe the interpreter. Any other local principal or local malware able to connect to the DSH web server's loopback port can rewrite settings (pythonPath/modelDir) and then trigger execution, yielding code execution as the DSH user on shared hosts or persistent config tampering. src/model.ts (the actual spawn) was not
- lowPOST /server/start and /server/stop lack CSRF protection
src/api.ts:272A malicious web page visited by the user can issue a simple cross-origin POST to 127.0.0.1:<port>/dsh-openjev-browser/api/server/start (or /server/stop). The request passes the loopback check and there is no Origin/Sec-Fetch-Site or token validation, letting the page start/stop the local model server (resource DoS, unexpected model load). PUT /config is not CSRF-able because PUT+JSON triggers preflight and no CORS headers are returned.
Browser-control plugin is largely well scoped, but its unauthenticated loopback settings API can set an executed pythonPath and start the model server, a potential local code-execution path.
Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-10-12 · activity: Active
• Repo created: 2026-10-12
• Stars: ★ 0 · Forks: 0
• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days
Source
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).