⚠️ This repository has been renamed: mengge237/dsh-model-priority — click to visit the new location. Everything below is preserved as originally indexed.
Install verification: runtime verified (L5) · tested on dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 · last checked Install verification details →
What it does
DSH 模型列表排序：侧边栏拖拽调整模型与提供方的顺序，宿主的模型选择器按这份顺序返回，写配置前自动备份 ｜ Model and provider ordering for DSH: drag to reorder in the sidebar, the host returns models in that order, and settings are backed up before every write
Installation
dsh plugin --profile web add github:mengge237-labs/dsh-model-priorityInstall method: GitHub · runtime verified (L5)
Verification & Compatibility
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
○ The author declares no dsh version requirement — install is not blocked by version.
| plugin ＼ dsh | dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 current |
|---|---|
| c18471 | ✓ |
c18471github✓ 1 runtime-verified2026-10-18
https://github.com/mengge237-labs/dsh-model-priority
✓dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-18L5 · runtime verified
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/mengge237-labs/dsh-model-priority (version unstated)
ID: dsh-model-priority-2@c18471@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-18 · expires: 2026-10-25
View checks & evidence
active in loader tree (150 entries)
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
Author badges
Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-model-priority-2/)``[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-model-priority-2/)`Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static low, dynamic medium — stricter wins → overall medium.
v0.2.5dsh manifestv0.2.5git2026-10-20v0.2.5same versionclean · gitVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (6)
- warningfsWrite · files
lib/backup.js:84fs.writeFileSync(tmp, next, 'utf8') - warningnetIp · network
lib/index.js:820const url = new URL(req.url, 'http://127.0.0.1') - warningnetIp · network
lib/index.js:856const url = new URL(req.url, 'http://127.0.0.1') - warningnetIp · network
lib/index.js:905const url = new URL(req.url, 'http://127.0.0.1') - warningfsWrite · files
lib/index.js:109fs.writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify(clean, null, 2) + '\n', 'utf8') - warningfsWrite · files
lib/proxy.js:45fs.writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify(c, null, 2) + '\n', 'utf8')
show 3 audit findings
- mediumOrigin check compares hostname only, so a page on any other localhost port passes the trust fence
lib/index.js:754Any page served from a different port on localhost/127.0.0.1 (dev servers, local dashboards) is treated as same-origin: its cross-origin fetch carries Host=localhost:3080 and Origin=http://localhost:<other-port>, whose hostnames match, so it can call PUT /dsh-model-priority/order.json, POST /settings-order and POST /proxy-enable without user action, rewriting ~/.dsh/settings.yaml or model-order.json and enabling the local key-rotation proxy. The plugin's own comment only justifies this for Chromium omitting the Origin port, but the check also drops scheme and every non-default port.
- low/proxy-enable echoes the rotation proxy token in the response body
lib/index.js:966setRouteBaseURL returns { ok, baseURL: value, ... } and the handler sends it verbatim, so any caller that passes the (weak, hostname-only) fence obtains the 48-hex token and can then drive the unguarded /rotate prefix, spending the user's API keys/quota against the configured providers. The route requires at least two keys in the pool, which is exactly this plugin's target scenario.
- lowProxy token file is written with default, umask-dependent permissions
lib/proxy.js:45~/.dsh/model-priority-proxy.json holds the only credential guarding the un-fenced /rotate proxy; with a common umask of 022 it is created 0644, so other local users on a shared machine can read the token and use the proxy with the owner's API keys.
Legit local DSH ordering plugin + key-rotation proxy; its CSRF fence ignores Origin port and /proxy-enable echoes the proxy token, allowing same-host pages to alter config and spend API keys.
Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-10-21 · activity: Active
• Repo created: 2026-09-20
• Stars: ★ 1 · Forks: 0
• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days
Source
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).