Install verification: runtime verified (L5) · tested on dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 · last checked Install verification details →
What it does
自动识别本机所有工具的 MCP 配置,并且能进行修改
Installation
dsh plugin --profile web add github:asfre/dsh-mcp-global-managerInstall method: GitHub · runtime verified (L5)
Verification & Compatibility
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
○ The author declares no dsh version requirement — install is not blocked by version.
| plugin \ dsh | dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 current |
|---|---|
| e1fcf3 | ✓ |
e1fcf3github✓ 1 runtime-verified2026-10-19
https://github.com/asfre/dsh-mcp-global-manager
✓dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-19L5 · runtime verified
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/asfre/dsh-mcp-global-manager (version unstated)
ID: dsh-mcp-global-manager@e1fcf3@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-19 · expires: 2026-10-26
View checks & evidence
active in loader tree (150 entries)
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
Author badges
Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-mcp-global-manager/)``[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-mcp-global-manager/)`Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static low, dynamic low — stricter wins → overall low.
v0.1.1dsh manifest0.1.1git2026-10-210.1.1same versionclean · gitVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (6)
- warningnetIp · network
tools/cold-start-check.mjs:488{ headers: { origin: 'http://127.0.0.1' }, expect: 403, label: 'Origin 能解析但 host 不对 → 拒', route: '/mcp-global/push', payload: csrfTarget }, - warningnetIp · network
tools/cold-start-check.mjs:490{ headers: { origin: 'http://127.0.0.1:19387', host: '127.0.0.1:19387' }, expect: 403, label: '同源面板放行(走到业务门才报只读,不是 CSRF)', route: '/mcp-glob - warningnetIp · network
tools/cold-start-check.mjs:509const r = await get('/mcp-global/scan', { remoteAddress: '10.1.2.3', headers: { origin: 'http://127.0.0.1:19387', host: '127.0.0.1:19387' } - warningnewFunction · code-exec
tools/smoke-client.mjs:76new Function('window', 'require', src)(fakeWindow, requireShim); - warningnetIp · network
tools/smoke-client.mjs:69location: { origin: 'http://127.0.0.1:19387' }, - warningnetIp · network
tools/smoke-client.mjs:184fakeServer({ key: 'kiro::http', sourceId: 'kiro', sourceLabel: 'Kiro', transport: 'streamable-http', url: 'http://127.0.0.1:9/mcp', headers:
show 2 audit findings
- lowSecret masking is key-name heuristic; args/cwd and non-matching env keys reach the panel unmasked
lib/index.js:46GET /scan returns every server's command/args/cwd and any env/header value whose key does not match this regex in cleartext to the loopback web panel (e.g. GITHUB_PAT, npm_config_*, or tokens embedded in args), even though the UI advertises that secrets are masked. Exposure is limited to the same-origin DSH page over loopback, so no remote exfiltration is demonstrated.
- lowCustom sources may target any path outside ~/.dsh, widening write-back beyond MCP configs
lib/index.jsThe only path ban for custom sources is ~/.dsh; any other JSON/TOML file the user names (e.g. ~/.config/..., ~/.bashrc if it parsed) becomes a scan target and, once writeBack is enabled and each entry authorized via /pushback, a rewrite target through /push. This requires explicit user action in the panel and is not attacker-driven, but the achievable write surface is broader than 'MCP client configs'.
Loopback-only, Origin-checked host API with per-entry push-back authorization and secret masking; the harvested host/client code shows no critical or high risk.
Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-10-16 · activity: Active
• Repo created: 2026-10-14
• Stars: ★ 0 · Forks: 0
• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days
Source
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).
