Install verification: Ecosystem app: not installed via dsh plugin add, so the L1-L5 plugin install-verification ladder does not apply; the security scan still runs.Install verification details →
What it doesAI
A liquid-glass and live-wallpaper theme for DeepSeek Harness with WebGL lens refraction, water ripples and frosted glass.
- WebGL liquid lens refraction and water-ripple interaction
- Layered frosted-glass UI plus custom image/video wallpapers
- One build supports both DSH Web and the official desktop app
Capability tags are AI-inferred or rule-extracted from the README (see badge) — vocabulary-limited, not install-verified. AI = inferred; README = literal keyword from the readme.
Installation
Ecosystem apps are not installable via dsh plugin add: desktop / web shells install or deploy through their own release channel (GitHub Releases or the project site).
The level reads L5 · Ecosystem plugin / L5 · Ecosystem app per the three-way classification (the L1-L5 ladder does not rate them); the security scan still runs.
Verification & Compatibility◼ Ecosystem app
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
| plugin \ dsh | dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 | dsh 0.2.1-alpha.2 |
|---|---|---|
| v2.0.3 | · | · |
v2.0.3github2026-10-18
https://github.com/Rainpomelo/dsh-liquid-glass-theme
Ecosystem app: not installed via dsh plugin add (a desktop / web shell) — its level reads L5 · Ecosystem app.
Only the latest 3 published versions are shown; source-snapshot (commit hash) groups, unstated groups and older versions are omitted — the full archive stays in the data layer (snapshot/unstated groups appear only when a plugin has no published version).
Author badges
Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-liquid-glass-theme-2/)`Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static low, dynamic high — stricter wins → overall high.
v2.0.3dsh manifestv2.0.3git2026-10-21v2.0.3same versionclean · gitVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (5)
- warningfsWrite · files
lib/index.js:80fs.writeFileSync(settingsFile, JSON.stringify(DEFAULT_SETTINGS), "utf8"); - warningfsWrite · files
lib/index.js:110fs.writeFileSync(wallpapersFile, JSON.stringify(defaultWallpapers), "utf8"); - warningfsWrite · files
lib/index.js:169fs.writeFileSync(settingsFile, body, "utf8"); - warningfsWrite · files
src/index.ts:99fs.writeFileSync(settingsFile, JSON.stringify(DEFAULT_SETTINGS), 'utf8') - warningfsWrite · files
src/index.ts:130fs.writeFileSync(wallpapersFile, JSON.stringify(defaultWallpapers), 'utf8')
show 4 audit findings
- highUnauthenticated /copy-local-file copies any local path into the publicly served wallpaper directory
lib/index.js:262sourcePath is taken verbatim from the request body with no allow-list, no root confinement and no authentication; id/ext are sanitised but that only constrains the destination. Anyone able to reach the loopback port (other local processes, or a web page issuing a simple cross-origin POST that needs no preflight) can stage an arbitrary file such as ~/.ssh/id_rsa or ~/.dsh/* into ~/.dsh/wallpapers, from where /api/liquid-glass/wallpaper-file streams it back; reading the response from a hostile web origin additionally needs a DNS-rebinding/CORS bypass, but the copy and overwrite of served files h
- mediumWhole /api/liquid-glass prefix is unauthenticated and allows cross-origin state tampering
lib/index.js:171Every route (settings, user-preset, wallpapers, upload-*, copy-local-file, wallpaper-file) runs with no authentication and no CSRF/Content-Type check. A simple cross-origin POST (text/plain needs no preflight) from any visited website, or any local process, can silently overwrite ~/.dsh/liquid-glass-settings.json, liquid-glass-user-preset.json and liquid-glass-wallpapers.json, and upload or replace wallpaper files. The Origin allow-list (isAppOrigin) only suppresses the CORS response header, so it limits reading from hostile web origins but does not prevent these writes, and is irrelevant for
- mediumUpload routes have no size limit: unbounded base64 body buffered in memory and unbounded stream written to disk
lib/index.js:290upload-wallpaper, settings, user-preset and wallpapers accumulate the entire request body in a string before parsing (no Content-Length cap, no auth), so a large POST from any local process or simple cross-origin request can exhaust the host process memory; upload-raw pipes the request directly into ~/.dsh/wallpapers with no quota, allowing disk exhaustion. Reachable pre-auth, so it is a concrete denial-of-service on the DSH host.
- lowRange header parsed without validation before createReadStream
lib/index.js:380A malformed Range header (e.g. 'bytes=abc-' or 'bytes=10-5') yields NaN or inverted bounds; createReadStream throws inside the async handler, producing an unhandled rejection / broken 206 response instead of a clean 416. Unauthenticated, so trivially triggerable, but impact is limited to error-path robustness.
Host half exposes an unauthenticated /api/liquid-glass prefix that copies an attacker-chosen local file into a publicly served folder, allowing arbitrary local file read.
Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-10-17 · activity: Active
• Repo created: 2026-08-18
• Stars: ★ 8 · Forks: 2
• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days
Source
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).
