Install verification: Ecosystem plugin: installs via dsh plugin add but declares no dsh.bundle and mounts no plugin capability — the L1-L5 install ladder does not rate it; the security scan still runs.Install verification details →
What it does
DeepSeek Harness sidebar dashboard plugin: task progress, downloads/extraction, training, tests, local+SSH GPU monitoring
Installation
dsh plugin --profile web add github:zjhaaa042-cloud/dsh-dashboardInstall method: GitHub · runtime test inconclusive (L5 unknown)
Verification & Compatibility○ Ecosystem plugin
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
○ The author declares no dsh version requirement — install is not blocked by version.
| plugin ＼ dsh | dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 current |
|---|---|
| 4e6fe9 | ○ |
4e6fe9github○ 1 ecosystem plugin2026-10-18
https://github.com/zjhaaa042-cloud/dsh-dashboard
○dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-18Ecosystem plugin
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/zjhaaa042-cloud/dsh-dashboard (version unstated)
ID: dsh-dashboard-6@4e6fe9@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-18 · expires: 2026-10-25
View checks & evidence
not present in web-profile loader inventory
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
Author badges
Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-dashboard-6/)`Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static low, dynamic low — stricter wins → overall low.
v1.0.0dsh manifest1.0.0git2026-10-211.0.0same versionclean · gitVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (2)
- criticalsubprocessShell · shell
index.js:80p = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout) - warningshellExec · shell
index.js:968execFile(executable, args, { timeout: timeoutMs, windowsHide: true, maxBuffer: 1024 * 1024 }, (error, stdout) => {
show 3 audit findings
- lowLoopback-only API exposes workspace paths, log tails and process command lines to any local user/process
index.jsThe fence authenticates by network address only, with no user identity. Any local account or local app that can reach the DSH port can enumerate the project tree, pull up to 8 KB tails of the newest .log/.txt inside any listed directory via /detail, and read ps-derived command lines / tmux details / GPU process names captured into the snapshot, which may contain tokens passed as CLI arguments. Cross-origin web pages cannot read the responses (no CORS headers, Host/Origin checks).
- lowrefresh route accepts GET, allowing cross-site subresource loads to force rebuilds and remote SSH exec
index.jsA cross-site <img>/<link> GET to /api/dino-dashboard/refresh carries no Origin header; browsers that omit Sec-Fetch-* metadata pass the fence. The response is unreadable (no CORS), but each hit forces a full local rescan plus a python3 probe over dsh-ssh on the configured remote host — a CSRF-style resource-exhaustion / side-effect trigger.
- lownvidia-smi resolved through PATH before the System32 fallback
index.jsexecFile resolves the first candidate via PATH; if an attacker can influence the server process's PATH/working directory (e.g. a planted nvidia-smi earlier in PATH), that binary runs with the DSH process privileges. Requires prior control of the process environment, so no direct attacker path from the API.
Refuted both static-scan hits: shell execs use fixed command strings and the detail route is snapshot-whitelisted; residual risks are local info exposure and GET-based refresh (low).
Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-10-20 · activity: Active
• Repo created: 2026-10-18
• Stars: ★ 1 · Forks: 0
• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days
Source
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).