Install verification: sandbox install ok, web smoke failed (L5) · tested on dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 · last checked Install verification details →
What it does
Replace DSH's built-in DeepSeek search with SearXNG / Tavily / Exa / Brave / Serper / Bing / Google CSE. web_search keeps its name and schema.
Installation
dsh plugin --profile web add github:Anixuil/dsh-custom-searchInstall method: GitHub · sandbox install ok, web smoke failed (L5)
Verification & Compatibility
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
○ The author declares no dsh version requirement — install is not blocked by version.
| plugin ＼ dsh | dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 current | dsh 0.2.1-alpha.4 |
|---|---|---|
| eb0402 | ✗ | ✗ |
eb0402github2 failed2026-10-18
https://github.com/Anixuil/dsh-custom-search
✗dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-18L5 · failed
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/Anixuil/dsh-custom-search (version unstated)
ID: dsh-custom-search@eb0402@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-18 · expires: 2026-10-25
View checks & evidence
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
✗dsh 0.2.1-alpha.42026-10-18L5 · failed
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-alpha.4
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/Anixuil/dsh-custom-search (version unstated)
ID: dsh-custom-search@eb0402@dsh0.2.1-alpha.4 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-18 · expires: 2026-10-25
View checks & evidence
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
Author badges
Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-custom-search/)`Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static low, dynamic low — stricter wins → overall low.
v0.4.3dsh manifest0.4.3git2026-10-210.4.3same versionclean · gitVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (5)
- warningnetIp · network
client.js:244hintEndpoint: '主引擎的接口基址。留空用官方地址；自建 SearXNG 填 http://127.0.0.1:8080。', - warningnetIp · network
client.js:319hintEndpoint: 'Base URL of the primary engine. Blank uses the vendor default; self-hosted SearXNG is http://127.0.0.1:8080.', - warningnetIp · network
dev/smoke.mjs:30const url = new URL(req.url, 'http://127.0.0.1') - warningnetIp · network
dev/smoke.mjs:92const origin = `http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}` - warningnetIp · network
engines.js:258defaultEndpoint: 'http://127.0.0.1:8080',
show 2 audit findings
- lowScheme-less endpoint override is silently coerced to plain http, so a keyed engine can send its API key in cleartext
engines.js:113`baseUrl()` receives the user's `endpoint`/`endpoints` override and, when it has no scheme, prepends `http://`. For a keyed engine (Tavily/Exa/Brave/Serper/Bing/Google) this produces a plaintext request carrying `authorization`/`x-api-key`, and `requestJson` only refuses redirects, not cleartext. Reachability requires a user to save an override like `api.tavily.com`; the settings page's `isHttpUrl` check flags this (chkEndpointBad) but does not block saving, so the misconfiguration can still reach the wire.
- lowCredential reference accepts any environment variable name that is then sent to the configured endpoint
index.js:175`reference` comes from the user-editable `apiKeyEnv` setting (or the engine default), and any process environment variable named there is used as the API key. Combined with the free-form `endpoint`/`endpoints` override, whoever can write this plugin's config can route e.g. `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` to a host of their choosing as a request header. The precondition (settings write access) already implies control of this plugin's credential handling, and the settings page discloses the resolved credential source, so this is a hardening gap rather than an exploitable channel.
Shipped code (index.js, engines.js, client.js) only performs user-configured search calls with good secret hygiene; two low-severity hardening notes, no critical/high issues.
Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-10-16 · activity: Active
• Repo created: 2026-10-16
• Stars: ★ 0 · Forks: 0
• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days
Source
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).