dsh-browser-ctrl

The route registered at line 1027 performs no auth/token or Origin check and also accepts GET, so any local process — and, blindly, any web page the user visits in a normal browser via a simple cross-origin GET such as /browser-use/command?action=navigate&url=... — can drive the managed browser, close tabs and wipe its data. The action=eval branch (lines 638-642) interpolates the caller's expression into Runtime.evaluate, i.e. arbitrary JS execution inside the managed page (reading its DOM/localStorage, issuing requests from that origin). Cross-origin responses are blocked by CORS, but the sid

detectBrowser() takes cfg.browserPath verbatim (line 101) and launchBrowser() passes it to spawn(exe, args) (line 174). The POST /browser-use/config handler (line 964) is unauthenticated, so any caller able to reach the dsh webserver port can point browserPath at an arbitrary executable and have dsh's own process launch it on the next browser start. This is the same 'any local caller' threat the author explicitly defends against for screenshot savePath (line 598), but no equivalent guard exists here.

navigate forces an https:// prefix for anything not matching ^https?:// (line 536), but new_tab uses the raw value from params.url (line 655) and navigates to it directly. A caller can open file:///C:/Users/... or file:///etc/passwd and then use action=read (READ_JS returns document.body.innerText) to read the file's contents, turning the unauthenticated command endpoint into a local-file read primitive.