@Shushushu-whn/dsh-brand-text

把 DSH Web 界面换成自家品牌（Logo / 名称 / 中央标题 / favicon），并给页面与项目文件夹打上「为什么加 · 在干什么」水印。Rebrand your DSH web UI and stamp "why added / what job" watermarks on pages and project folders.

PluginBrowserUI & SkinsWeb searchFile

Verification

L5 · Run tested

Verified

Risk

Critical

Health

Active

Trust

Silver

Install verification: runtime verified (L5) · tested on dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 · last checked 10-21Install verification details →

What it does

Installation

dsh plugin --profile web add dsh-brand-text

verified 0.4.0

Install method: npm · runtime verified (L5)

Verification & Compatibility

Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.

External credentials (plugin-level): none detected

Declared DSH compatibilityfrom package.json · peerDependencies

author declared no dsh version requirement

○ The author declares no dsh version requirement — install is not blocked by version.

Install compatibility matrix (rows = plugin versions〔latest 5〕, columns = dsh versions〔latest 5〕)

At-a-glance → evidence in the cards below

plugin ＼ dsh	dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 current
0.4.0	✓

Install compatibility (by plugin version, dsh versions within)

Legend:✓ L5 runtime verified○ ecosystem plugin◼ ecosystem app✗ failed

0.4.0npm✓ 1 runtime-verified2026-10-21

dsh-brand-text

✓dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-21L5 · runtime verified

Environment & artifact

• Node.js: v24.14.0
• DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
• Plugin artifact: npm · dsh-brand-text@0.4.0

Levels (L1–L3 plugin-level static archive · L4/L5 newest real verdicts for this combination)

L1 static

Passed

L2 static

Passed

L3 static

Passed

L4 sandbox

Passed

L5 runtime

Passed

Install + runtime smoke verified in the dsh sandbox — installs and runs

L5 · runtime verified · valid for dsh 0.2.1-rc.2

ID: dsh-brand-text@0.4.0@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l3-fullscan

Issued: 2026-10-21 · expires: 2026-10-28

View checks & evidence

L1 · Found✓ Passed

Defaulted from L3L1.0_DEFAULTED_FROM_L3✓ Passed

defaulted to passed — L3 install spec passed (full-registry L3 sweep policy)

L2 · Structured✓ Passed

Defaulted from L3L2.0_DEFAULTED_FROM_L3✓ Passed

defaulted to passed — L3 install spec passed (full-registry L3 sweep policy)

L3 · Install spec✓ Passed

Install command parsedL3.1_INSTALL_COMMAND_PARSED✓ Passed

Source: registry verification · Method: install spec parse · Captured 2026-10-21

DSH version declaredL3.2_DSH_VERSION_DECLARED✓ Passed

Source: registry verification · Method: DSH version declaration · Captured 2026-10-21

L4 · Install tested✓ Passed

Install executed in confined sandboxL4.1_INSTALL_EXECUTED_CONFINED✓ Passed

Source: Windows ACL sandbox · Method: sandbox install run · Captured 2026-10-19

spec dsh-brand-text · channel npm package · outcome ran · exit 0

check took: 2.3s

Install succeededL4.2_INSTALL_SUCCESS✓ Passed

Source: Windows ACL sandbox · Method: sandbox install run · Captured 2026-10-19

spec dsh-brand-text · channel npm package · outcome ran · exit 0

check took: 2.3s

Installed artifact confirmedL4.3_ARTIFACT_CONFIRMED✓ Passed

Source: Windows ACL sandbox · Method: sandbox install run · Captured 2026-10-19

spec dsh-brand-text · channel npm package · outcome ran · exit 0

check took: 2.3s

L5 · Run tested✓ Passed

active in loader tree (150 entries)

Sandbox install passedL5.1_INSTALL_PASSED_SANDBOXED✓ Passed

Source: Windows ACL sandbox · Method: sandbox install run · Captured 2026-10-19

spec dsh-brand-text · install mode reused L4 scratch

check took: 52ms

Web boot readyL5.2_WEB_BOOT_READY✓ Passed

Source: DSH runtime · Method: web boot · Captured 2026-10-19

ready line dsh web: http://127.0.0.1:58638/?token=…

HTTP endpoint servedL5.3_HTTP_SERVED✓ Passed

Source: DSH runtime · Method: HTTP request · Captured 2026-10-19

path / · HTTP 200 · took 52ms

Plugin active in inventoryL5.4_PLUGIN_INVENTORY_ACTIVE✓ Passed

Source: DSH runtime · Method: plugin inventory query · Captured 2026-10-19

verdict active · entries 150

match: include:dsh-brand-text · dsh-brand-text · phase active

phases: active 121 · null 29

L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.

Only the latest 3 published versions are shown; source-snapshot (commit hash) groups, unstated groups and older versions are omitted — the full archive stays in the data layer (snapshot/unstated groups appear only when a plugin has no published version).

Author badges

Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:

Security Report

Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.

dsh-brand-textAutomated review · daily

Static low, dynamic high — stricter wins → overall high.

static low→dynamic high→overall high

0 critical·0 high

highoverall · high

1static scan · vet primaryvet AST static analysis (npm artifact or git source)

Version binding

plugin versionv0.4.0dsh manifest

scanned version0.4.0npm2026-10-21

current version0.4.0same version

vet verdictclean · npm

Vet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).

show static findings (5)

warningshellExec · shellinstall.mjs:75
execFileSync(cmd, args, { cwd: resolve(profileDir), stdio, env, shell: true })
warningnetIp · networkinstall.mjs:77
console.log(' http://127.0.0.1:<该 profile 的 DSH 端口>/brand-studio/')
warningshellExec · shelllib/index.js:329
execFile('explorer', [path], { windowsHide: true }, () => {})
warningnetIp · networklib/index.js:77
return new URL(req.url || '/', 'http://127.0.0.1').searchParams
warningshellExec · shelllib/watermark.js:179
execFile('attrib', args, { windowsHide: true }, (err) => resolve(err ? String(err.message) : ''))

2dynamic auditmodel reads redacted source context · never executes plugin code

highest gradehigh

merged intooverall high

audited at2026-10-19

findings0 critical·1 high2 medium / 1 low hidden

show 4 audit findings

highUnauthenticated route writes/deletes files in any caller-supplied path (arbitrary filesystem write)lib/index.js:296
POST /brand-studio/api/watermark/target takes an arbitrary path, does stat() on it, writes `<name>.DSH水印说明.md`, `dsh-mark.ico` and `desktop.ini` (backing up an existing desktop.ini to desktop.ini.dshbak) into that directory, runs `attrib +h/+s`, and with remove:true deletes those files (no ledger check on the remove branch). There is no auth or CSRF protection: the handler JSON.parses the raw body regardless of Content-Type, so a cross-origin simple POST (no-cors, text/plain) or any local process can drive it. Paths may be UNC/network shares, which also leaks NTLM auth via stat()/writeFile. Co
mediumexplorer launched on caller-chosen path; the 'ledger' allow-list is filled by the same unauthenticated endpointlib/index.js:329
The guard checks the path against watermark.targets, but that list is written by /api/watermark/target, which the same caller controls: one POST to add any existing writable path, then POST /api/open with it. execFile without shell prevents shell injection, but explorer is then asked to open an attacker-selected local or UNC path (SMB credential exposure, opening arbitrary files/folders).
mediumUploaded SVG logo is served from the DSH origin without CSP, giving stored XSS via /brand-studio/logolib/index.js:217
Any caller that can reach /api/save (same CSRF/local-access caveat as above) can store an SVG containing script; it is later returned by GET /brand-studio/logo with image/svg+xml and no Content-Security-Policy. Navigating the victim to that URL executes script in the DSH origin, from which the other /brand-studio APIs and any same-origin DSH endpoints are reachable.
lowInstaller runs package manager with execFileSync and shell:trueinstall.mjs:75
With shell:true Node builds a shell command line; here cmd/args come from a hardcoded list and profileDir is only used as cwd, so no user-supplied string is currently injectable. It is a hardening gap only, but it makes any future change that interpolates arguments a command-injection bug, and it also runs a dependency install as part of ordinary setup.

Unauthenticated local HTTP routes accept attacker-chosen file paths: arbitrary write/delete via /api/watermark/target, and /api/open launches Explorer on a 'ledger' the same caller filled.

Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.

Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.

Activity

Last commit 2026-10-17 · activity: Active

• Repo created: 2026-10-17

• Stars: ★ 1 · Forks: 0

• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days

Source

GitHub: github.com/Shushushu-whn/dsh-brand-text

Plugin notes

What is the @Shushushu-whn/dsh-brand-text DeepSeek Harness plugin?

@Shushushu-whn/dsh-brand-text is a DeepSeek Harness plugin maintained by @Shushushu-whn. It is cataloged on dsh.so as a Browser plugin for Web search tasks, with a public GitHub source, declared install command, and automated static scan results; plugins static-flagged at warn or above also carry a model-driven dynamic security audit record.

How do I install @Shushushu-whn/dsh-brand-text?

Run dsh plugin --profile web add dsh-brand-text in a DeepSeek Harness (dsh) environment. This exact command has been verified by a real install inside an isolated windows-acl sandbox (L4) plus web smoke testing (L5).

How does the security scan relate to a manual audit?

Both layers are automated, not a manual audit: the static scan is heuristic analysis of the repository source (it can produce false positives and miss context), and the dynamic security audit has a model read the harvested source context with secret files stripped and content redacted inline — plugin code is never executed. The dynamic audit only covers plugins static-flagged at warn or above, and its conclusion can only raise the combined verdict, never exempt it. Neither layer is a manual security audit or an endorsement; before using a plugin, review the repository and installed permissions, and combine both with the verification level (L4/L5) and health signals.

"DeepSeek Harness (dsh) is an open-source agent harness developed by DeepSeek AI. It uses an architecture where everything is a plugin, and is powered by Cordis."
— DeepSeek Harness README

Sources: GitHub repository · DeepSeek Harness README · security scan data · Maintained by dsh.so · Last updated 2026-10-18

@Shushushu-whn/dsh-brand-text

What it does

Installation

Verification & Compatibility

Author badges

Security Report

Activity

Source

Author README