Install verification: runtime verified (L5) · tested on dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 · last checked Install verification details →
What it does
DSH 插件:每天替你刷一轮 B站 —— 读字幕原文挑出值得的、写一份日报,值得的就 @ 你
Installation
dsh plugin --profile web add github:lll-77777777/dsh-bili-scrollInstall method: GitHub · runtime verified (L5)
Verification & Compatibility
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
○ The author declares no dsh version requirement — install is not blocked by version.
| plugin \ dsh | dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 current |
|---|---|
| 790a09 | ✓ |
790a09github✓ 1 runtime-verified2026-10-19
https://github.com/lll-77777777/dsh-bili-scroll
✓dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-19L5 · runtime verified
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/lll-77777777/dsh-bili-scroll (version unstated)
ID: dsh-bili-scroll-2@790a09@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-19 · expires: 2026-10-26
View checks & evidence
active in loader tree (150 entries)
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
Author badges
Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-bili-scroll-2/)``[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-bili-scroll-2/)`Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static low, dynamic high — stricter wins → overall high.
v0.1.7dsh manifest0.1.7git2026-10-210.1.7same versionclean · npmVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (4)
- warningchildProcess · code-exec
lib/login.mjs:97child = spawn(pythonPath || 'python', ['-c', code, url, png], { cwd: stateDir, windowsHide: true }) - warningchildProcess · code-exec
lib/mcp.mjs:32this.proc = spawn(command, args, { - warningchildProcess · code-exec
lib/uvfetch.mjs:69const r = spawnSync(cmd, args, { stdio: 'ignore' }) - warningchildProcess · code-exec
lib/uvfetch.mjs:147const r = spawnSync(target, ['--version'], { stdio: 'ignore' })
show 3 audit findings
- highuv auto-installer executes binaries from third-party proxies with non-independent hash check
lib/uvfetch.mjs:130A compromised or malicious proxy (or a failed .sha256 fetch) can supply a modified uv archive; the plugin extracts it and executes the downloaded binary on first install/run, giving code execution as the DSH user.
- mediumBilibili session cookies are written to a plaintext file with default permissions
lib/login.mjs:81SESSDATA and bili_jct are stored in clear at $DSH_HOME/bili-duty/bili_credential.json; on multi-user POSIX systems the default umask can make it readable by other local users or processes, allowing Bilibili account impersonation.
- mediumUntrusted Bilibili comment text is rendered directly into the LLM reply prompt
lib/threads.mjs:532When replying to arbitrary commenters (reply-only-me disabled), an attacker can embed instructions in a comment; renderInbox passes them verbatim to the LLM prompt that drives bili_reply, so the model may follow attacker text and post unintended replies or perform other Bilibili actions.
Static warn confirmed: uv bootstrap can execute a proxy-supplied binary, login tokens are stored world-readable, and comment text reaches the LLM prompt; other spawns use argv-safe fixed hosts.
Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-10-20 · activity: Active
• Repo created: 2026-10-16
• Stars: ★ 3 · Forks: 0
• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days
Source
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).
