Install verification: runtime verified (L5) · tested on dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 · last checked Install verification details →
What it does
DSH 插件:安卓真机镜像/控制/截图,下载即用
Installation
dsh plugin --profile web add github:Lovepeace-art/dsh-android-phone#v1.0.0Install method: GitHub · runtime verified (L5)
Verification & Compatibility
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
○ The author declares no dsh version requirement — install is not blocked by version.
| plugin \ dsh | dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 current |
|---|---|
| v1.0.0 | ✓ |
v1.0.0github✓ 1 runtime-verified2026-10-19
https://github.com/Lovepeace-art/dsh-android-phone
✓dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-19L5 · runtime verified
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/Lovepeace-art/dsh-android-phone#v1.0.0
ID: dsh-android-phone@v1.0.0@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-19 · expires: 2026-10-26
View checks & evidence
active in loader tree (150 entries)
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
Author badges
Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-android-phone/)``[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-android-phone/)`Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static low, dynamic high — stricter wins → overall high.
v1.0.0dsh manifestv1.0.0git2026-10-21v1.0.0same versionclean · gitVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (7)
- warningchildProcess · code-exec
src/android/adb.js:150child = spawn(exe, ['-L', `tcp:${port}`, 'nodaemon', 'server'], { windowsHide: true, stdio: 'ignore' }); - warningchildProcess · code-exec
src/android/adb.js:178child = spawn(exe, full, { windowsHide: true, stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'] }); - warningchildProcess · code-exec
src/android/touchWatch.js:69try { p = spawn(adb, args, { windowsHide: true }); } catch { resolve(''); return; } - warningchildProcess · code-exec
src/android/touchWatch.js:111child = spawn(adb, ['-s', String(serial), 'shell', `getevent -lt ${device}`], { windowsHide: true }); - warningchildProcess · code-exec
src/android/video.js:222spawnSync(adbPath || resolveAdb() || 'adb', args, { stdio: 'ignore', timeout: timeoutMs, windowsHide: true }); - warningchildProcess · code-exec
src/android/video.js:244const r = spawnSync(bin, [...serialArgs, 'reverse', '--list'], { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: timeoutMs, windowsHide: true }); - warningchildProcess · code-exec
src/android/video.js:252const d = spawnSync(bin, [...serialArgs, 'reverse', '--remove', spec], { stdio: 'ignore', timeout: timeoutMs, windowsHide: true });
show 2 audit findings
- highIncomplete shell escaping in typeText enables adb shell command injection
src/android/adb.js:576When the scrcpy control channel is unavailable, actions.js sends action.text through typeText. Backticks and some `$` expansions are not escaped, so text like `` `id` `` is evaluated by the device shell before `input text`; side effects execute as the Android shell user. This bypasses UI-only control and can read/exfiltrate device data or alter device state.
- highPackage name is interpolated into adb device shell without validation
src/android/adb.js:402The `launch` action accepts an arbitrary package string and launchApp interpolates it unquoted into a device shell command. A value such as `com.x; reboot` or a backtick payload executes extra commands as the Android shell user whenever launch falls back to adb (no control channel/session).
Two high-risk adb-shell injection paths let model-controlled text or package strings run arbitrary commands on the connected Android device.
Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-10-18 · activity: Active
• Repo created: 2026-10-18
• Stars: ★ 0 · Forks: 0
• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days
Source
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).
