Install verification: Ecosystem plugin: installs via dsh plugin add but declares no dsh.bundle and mounts no plugin capability — the L1-L5 install ladder does not rate it; the security scan still runs.Install verification details →
What it does
Evidence over claims for coding agents: 55 DSH/MCP tools (23 read-only) that build, drive, capture and profile a live Windows desktop app, then adjudicate what the agent claims against real evidence. Failure corpus included.
Installation
dsh plugin --profile web add github:lemonmmice/dsh-agent-toolchain#v0.1.0Install method: GitHub · runtime test inconclusive (L5 unknown)
Verification & Compatibility○ Ecosystem plugin
Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.
External credentials (plugin-level): none detected
○ The author declares no dsh version requirement — install is not blocked by version.
| plugin \ dsh | dsh 0.2.1-rc.2 current |
|---|---|
| v0.1.0 | ○ |
v0.1.0github○ 1 ecosystem plugin2026-10-20
https://github.com/lemonmmice/dsh-agent-toolchain
○dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-20Ecosystem plugin
- • Node.js: v24.14.0
- • DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
- • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/lemonmmice/dsh-agent-toolchain#v0.1.0
ID: dsh-agent-toolchain@v0.1.0@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l4-sandbox
Issued: 2026-10-20 · expires: 2026-10-27
View checks & evidence
not present in web-profile loader inventory
L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.
Author badges
Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:
`[](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-agent-toolchain/)`Security Report
Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.
Static low, dynamic medium — stricter wins → overall medium.
v0.1.0v0.1.0git2026-10-21v0.1.0same versionclean · gitVet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).
show static findings (4)
- warningchildProcess · code-exec
mcp/smoke.mjs:9const child = spawn(process.execPath, [join(here, 'server.mjs')], { stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'] }) - warningfsWrite · files
plugins/dsh-memory/lib/embed-provider.mjs:69fs.writeFileSync(path.join(this.cacheDir, "emb-" + (h >>> 0).toString(36) + ".json"), JSON.stringify({ vector })); - warningfsWrite · files
plugins/dsh-memory/lib/kv.mjs:17_write(rows) { fs.writeFileSync(this.file, rows.map(r => JSON.stringify(r)).join("\n") + "\n"); } - warningfsWrite · files
plugins/dsh-memory/lib/store.mjs:21fs.writeFileSync(this.file, rows.map(r => JSON.stringify(r)).join("\n") + "\n");
show 4 audit findings
- mediummemory_index accepts any absolute path, letting the agent ingest credential/settings files
plugins/dsh-memory/index.js:48indexWorkspace (plugins/dsh-memory/lib/memory.mjs:37-49) walks whatever root it is given with no confinement to a project, and the extension filter in `else if (/\.(md|txt|json|yaml|yml|cs|ts|js|mjs|py|xaml|xml|html|vue|sql)$/i.test(e.name))` admits .yaml/.yml/.json/.txt, so ~/.dsh/.credentials.yaml and ~/.dsh/settings.yaml are readable. Chunk text is then embedded (forwarded to MiniMax when a key exists), persisted under ~/.dsh/memory, and echoed back to the model by memory_search (400 chars per chunk). Repo content that the model is asked to index can therefore steer it into sweeping a home
- mediumPrompt claims data never leaves the machine, but indexed text is POSTed to api.minimax.chat
plugins/dsh-memory/lib/embed-provider.mjs:60When MINIMAX_CN_API_KEY is present (env or ~/.dsh/.credentials.yaml), every chunk of indexed file content is sent to https://api.minimax.chat/v1/embeddings (line 57). The systemPrompt registered in plugins/dsh-memory/index.js:20 states '数据全部存储在本地 ~/.dsh/memory/,不外传。', so both the user and the model are told the opposite of the actual data flow when deciding whether to index private code.
- mediumhttp_request core has no host allowlist and follows redirects, enabling SSRF from the agent
plugins/dsh-postman/lib/http.mjs:66The only validation is `if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:' && parsed.protocol !== 'https:')` (line 56); there is no loopback/LAN/metadata host filtering and the request uses `redirect: 'follow'` (line 71), so a URL that looks public can redirect to 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254 or an intranet service, and up to 2 MiB of the response body is returned into the agent context. The postman/ui-drive index.js wrapper and mcp/server.mjs were not harvested, but the package description and cordis patch state http_request is exposed as an agent tool over this core.
- lowMemory stores are plaintext with umask-default permissions and parsed without validation
plugins/dsh-memory/lib/kv.mjs:14KV memories and indexed chunks (which may include secrets pulled in via the memory_index path issue) are written to ~/.dsh/memory with default file modes and no encryption; an unguarded JSON.parse on each line means a corrupted or externally modified kv.jsonl / vector JSONL makes every memory tool throw instead of degrading.
Agent tools can index arbitrary local paths (incl. credentials) whose text is sent to MiniMax despite a 'stays local' prompt claim; http_request allows unconstrained SSRF.
Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.
Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.
Activity
Last commit 2026-10-19 · activity: Active
• Repo created: 2026-09-16
• Stars: ★ 3 · Forks: 0
• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days
Source
Author README
View on GitHub ↗The author's original README from the repository — fetched live, unedited (the English page loads the default README).
