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@bigk5780/dsh

鲸鱼娘陪玩

Ecosystem plugin
Verification
L5 · Ecosystem plugin
Ecosystem plugin
Risk
Critical
Health
Active
Trust
Silver

Install verification: Ecosystem plugin: installs via dsh plugin add but declares no dsh.bundle and mounts no plugin capability — the L1-L5 install ladder does not rate it; the security scan still runs.Install verification details →

What it does

鲸鱼娘陪玩

Installation

dsh plugin --profile web add github:bigk5780/dsh
verified

Install method: GitHub · runtime test inconclusive (L5 unknown)

Verification & Compatibility○ Ecosystem plugin

Grouped by plugin version: each card lists the dsh versions actually tested against that artifact version and their install verdicts (L5 wins). Untested combinations are omitted — absence means untested, never assumed compatible. L1–L3 are a plugin-level static archive (independent of the dsh version — the same verdict on every dsh row): they sit in each row's level grid next to L4/L5, marked "static", while their evidence is stored once per plugin inside that row's "checks & evidence" instead of being duplicated per version.

External credentials (plugin-level): none detected

Declared DSH compatibilityfrom package.json · peerDependencies
author declared no dsh version requirement

○ The author declares no dsh version requirement — install is not blocked by version.

Install compatibility matrix (rows = plugin versions〔latest 5〕, columns = dsh versions〔latest 5〕)
○ Ecosystem plugin
At-a-glance → evidence in the cards below
plugin ＼ dshdsh 0.2.1-rc.2
current
d7cbba○
Install compatibility (by plugin version, dsh versions within)
Legend:✓ L5 runtime verified○ ecosystem plugin◼ ecosystem app✗ failed
d7cbbagithub○ 1 ecosystem plugin2026-10-19

https://github.com/bigk5780/dsh

○dsh 0.2.1-rc.2current2026-10-19Ecosystem plugin
Environment & artifact
  • • Node.js: v24.14.0
  • • DSH: 0.2.1-rc.2
  • • Plugin artifact: github · https://github.com/bigk5780/dsh (version unstated)
Levels (L1–L3 plugin-level static archive · L4/L5 newest real verdicts for this combination)
L1 static
Passed
L2 static
Passed
L3 static
Passed
L4 sandbox
Passed
L5 runtime
Unknown
Ecosystem plugin: no install verdict — not a usable dsh plugin (shown as L5 · ecosystem plugin)
Ecosystem plugin

ID: dsh-6@d7cbba@dsh0.2.1-rc.2 · profile: l4-sandbox

Issued: 2026-10-19 · expires: 2026-10-26

View checks & evidence
L1 · Found✓ Passed
Defaulted from L3✓ Passed
defaulted to passed — L3 install spec passed (full-registry L3 sweep policy)
L2 · Structured✓ Passed
Defaulted from L3✓ Passed
defaulted to passed — L3 install spec passed (full-registry L3 sweep policy)
L3 · Install spec✓ Passed
Install command parsed✓ Passed
Source: registry verification · Method: install spec parse · Captured 2026-10-18
DSH version declared✓ Passed
Source: registry verification · Method: DSH version declaration · Captured 2026-10-18
L4 · Install tested✓ Passed
Install executed in confined sandbox✓ Passed
Source: Windows ACL sandbox · Method: sandbox install run · Captured 2026-10-19
spec github:bigk5780/dsh · channel GitHub source · outcome ran · exit 0
check took: 2.0s
Install succeeded✓ Passed
Source: Windows ACL sandbox · Method: sandbox install run · Captured 2026-10-19
spec github:bigk5780/dsh · channel GitHub source · outcome ran · exit 0
check took: 2.0s
Installed artifact confirmed✓ Passed
Source: Windows ACL sandbox · Method: sandbox install run · Captured 2026-10-19
spec github:bigk5780/dsh · channel GitHub source · outcome ran · exit 0
check took: 2.0s
L5 · Run tested? Unknown

not present in web-profile loader inventory

Sandbox install passed✓ Passed
Source: Windows ACL sandbox · Method: sandbox install run · Captured 2026-10-19
spec github:bigk5780/dsh · install mode reused L4 scratch
check took: 139ms
Web boot ready✓ Passed
Source: DSH runtime · Method: web boot · Captured 2026-10-19
ready line dsh web: http://127.0.0.1:58014/?token=…
HTTP endpoint served✓ Passed
Source: DSH runtime · Method: HTTP request · Captured 2026-10-19
path / · HTTP 200 · took 139ms
Plugin active in inventory? Unknown
Source: DSH runtime · Method: plugin inventory query · Captured 2026-10-19
verdict not-found · entries 149
phases: active 121 · null 28
not present in web-profile loader inventory

L1–L3 are plugin-level static conclusions (baseline, identical across dsh versions): evidence is stored once per plugin.

Author badges

Embed the official badges in your README to showcase security & install-test status:

dsh.so risk
`[![dsh.so risk](https://www.dsh.so/badge/dsh-6.svg)](https://www.dsh.so/artifact/dsh-6/)`

Security Report

Two automated layers, neither a manual review: a static scan (per-plugin rule checks) and a model-driven dynamic security audit that covers only the subset static-flagged at warn or above and never executes plugin code.

dsh-6Automated review · daily

Static low, dynamic high — stricter wins → overall high.

static low→dynamic high→overall high
0 critical·0 high
highoverall · high
1static scan · vet primaryvet AST static analysis (npm artifact or git source)
Version binding
plugin versionv0.1.0dsh manifest
scanned version0.1.0git2026-10-21
current version0.1.0same version
vet verdictclean · git

Vet is an AST static scan (npm artifact or git source).

show static findings (4)
  • criticalbase64Blob · obfuscationsrc/host/vision-api.mjs:209

    'iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAACAAAAAgCAYAAABzenr0AAAAAXNSR0IArs4c6QAAAARnQU1BAACxjwv8YQUAAAAJcEhZcwAADsMAAA7DAcdvqGQAAACESURBVFhH7dFBCsAgDETRHsz

  • warningshellExec · shellsrc/host/collect.mjs:91

    execFile(file, args, options, (error, stdout, stderr) => {

  • warningchildProcess · code-execsrc/host/desktop-window.mjs:70

    child = spawn(binary, [path.join(OVERLAY_DIR, 'main.mjs')], {

  • warningnetIp · networksrc/host/plugin.mjs:120

    const url = new URL(req.url ?? '/', 'http://127.0.0.1');

2dynamic auditmodel reads redacted source context · never executes plugin code
highest gradehigh
merged intooverall high
audited at2026-10-19
findings0 critical·1 high2 medium / 1 low hidden
show 4 audit findings
  • highUnauthenticated /config and /once routes let any web page repoint the vision API and exfiltrate screen capturessrc/host/plugin.mjs:204

    The prefix route is registered on the local webServer with no token, Origin check or content-type check (readJson parses any body). Because cross-origin 'simple' POSTs (mode:'no-cors', text/plain) are not preflighted, a page the user merely visits can blindly POST a config patch setting visionApi.enabled=true, baseURL=<attacker host>, model and captureFullScreen=true, then POST /once; runCycle({force:true}) skips the enabled and game checks and describeImage() sends the screenshot to the attacker's endpoint before the text step can fail. Net effect: covert exfiltration of screen contents to an

  • mediumScreenshots are silently uploaded to a hard-coded public third-party endpoint when no vision model is configuredsrc/host/advise.mjs:150

    When the user has not configured a custom vision API and the provider registry yields no image-capable candidate (the code comments state this is the normal case on the author's machine), describeImage() falls back to an anonymous OVHcloud endpoint and POSTs the base64 screenshot there without any consent step. The image is a full-screen or foreground-window capture, i.e. whatever the user has on screen; it leaves the machine to an operator unrelated to the user, and there is no UI switch to disable just this fallback (it is only mentioned inside GET /vision diagnostics).

  • mediumGET /config returns the raw user config file, exposing the plaintext vision API keysrc/host/plugin.mjs:198

    publicConfig() deliberately redacts visionApi.apiKey ('apiKey 永远只回"有没有"，绝不回明文'), but the same response also embeds readUserConfig(), which is the verbatim contents of $DSH_HOME/dsh-game-pet.json — the file writeUserConfig() stores with the real key (writeUserConfig(accepted) persists accepted.visionApi.apiKey unchanged). Any client that can reach the route (a local process, another plugin, or a DNS-rebinding page) receives the API key in cleartext, contradicting the plugin's own secret-handling contract and enabling billable API abuse with the user's key.

  • lowVision API key persisted in plaintext in $DSH_HOME/dsh-game-pet.jsonsrc/host/config-store.mjs:33

    The key is written to a world-readable-by-default home file with no OS keychain or file-mode restriction; any process running as the user (or a backup/sync agent covering ~/.dsh) can read it. The plugin documents this in config.mjs, but it compounds the GET /config leak above.

Unauthenticated local routes let a web page repoint the vision API and trigger screen capture; screenshots also auto-upload to a hard-coded endpoint, and GET /config leaks the API key.

Rule: the dynamic audit can only raise risk, never lower it (raise-only, never an exemption); a wrong raise is withdrawn by human review and the tier falls back to the static verdict. Overall verdict = the stricter of the two layers.

Disclaimer: the static scan and the dynamic security audit are both automated analysis, not a security guarantee. Always review what you install.

Activity

Last commit 2026-10-17 · activity: Active

• Repo created: 2026-10-16

• Stars: ★ 0 · Forks: 0

• Health: Active — committed within last 30 days

Source

GitHub: github.com/bigk5780/dsh

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